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I. INTRODUCTION
In its first term, the Obama Administration signed into law two tax
reforms, each designed to protect an increasingly vulnerable income tax
base, and each of which had the potential to set a new and unprecedented
course for no less than the regulation of the global economy by the nationstate. The first reform, known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), sought to end global tax evasion through tax havens.1 The

* Allison Christians, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Taxation, McGill University Faculty of
Law. Thanks are due to the participants of the Pepperdine Law Review Symposium on Tax Advice
for the Second Obama Administration, January 18, 2013, for their insightful comments, to the editors
of the Pepperdine Law Review, and to Montano Cabezas, to whom I am indebted for his tireless
efforts and consistent excellence in research assistance. This article is part of Pepperdine Law
Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration symposium, cosponsored by Tax Analysts.
1. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act §§ 501–531, Pub. L. No. 111–147, 124 Stat.
71 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/PLAW-111publ147/pdf/PLAW-111publ147.pdf.
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second, a little-noticed two-page addendum to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),2 sought to end the
contribution of American multinationals to corruption in governance by
codifying the transparency principles of the global Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI).3
Both of these regimes cast a vastly more global role for the nation-state
in regulating its people and their resources. Each thus represents a move in
the right direction, since a declining role for the state in the regulation of the
global economy translates to the decline, disarray, and eventually the
complete dismantling of income taxation as a viable means for raising
revenue. But neither of these reforms has yet to fulfill its potential. First,
each raises difficult questions about what the state can and cannot do to
enforce disclosure and compliance.4 Failing to answer these questions
impedes the implementation of each regime and aggravates the steady
decline of taxpayer morale.5 Second, neither is broad enough: FATCA
should be fully reciprocal while carving out Americans resident in other
countries,6 and EITI should expand beyond the extractive industries to
public companies more generally. By acknowledging and responding in a
principled way to the obstacles that limit their effectiveness, a second
Obama Administration could take significant steps to bring each reform to
its potential, while ensuring that its scope focuses on the intended target in
each case. This Article outlines how these proposals could be accomplished
and makes the case that they should be attempted.
Part I provides the background for the discussion by describing the
enactment of each reform, and exploring the legislators’ expressed intentions
as well as the political, social, and cultural context surrounding the reforms’
enactment. Part II explores how each regime redefines the role of the

2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1504, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78m(q) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-208).
3. See The Cardin-Lugar Amendment (Dodd-Frank 1504), PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY,
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/about/stock-listings/cardin-lugar-amendment-dodd-frank-1504
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013). EITI grew out of the Publish What You Pay movement. See History of
EITI, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti/history (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
4. See discussion infra Part IV.
5. See discussion infra Part IV.
6. Although the FATCA’s Model Inter-Governmental Agreements do have “reciprocal”
versions, the reciprocity is mostly aspirational in nature. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MODEL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND TO IMPLEMENT FATCA
13–14 (Nov. 14, 2012),[hereinafter MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT] available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/joint_intl_statement_fatca_260712.pdf
(“Reciprocity[:]
The
[Government of the] United States acknowledges the need to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal
automatic information exchange with [FATCA Partner]. The [Government of the] United States is
committed to further improve transparency and enhance the exchange relationship with [FATCA
Partner] by pursuing the adoption of regulations and advocating and supporting relevant legislation
to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange.”).
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nation-state in the regulation of its taxpayers and their resources, and why a
principled definition of that role is vital for the future of income taxation not
only in the U.S., but also globally. Part III raises some of the difficult issues
that require resolution for further advancement of the underlying goals
outlined in Part II. The Article concludes with aspirations for a revived role
for the nation-state in the regulation of the global economy and a renewed
vigor for the protection of income taxation.
II. BACKGROUND: WHY THESE REFORMS, AND WHY NOW?
Income taxation is under grave threat.7 Every nation-state in the world
is both a participant and a potential victim in a global game of tax
competition that erodes and undermines comprehensive income taxation
wherever it is attempted. Each nation must safeguard its tax base against the
aggressive maneuvering of its taxpayers, aided in their quest by too-easily
manipulated rules and the complicity of foreign intermediaries—be they
public or private—that stand to gain by being a mercenary in this global
game.8 At the same time, each nation benefits itself by embracing

7. See Allison Christians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice in THE CARTER
COMMISSION: FIFTY YEARS LATER (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that states are presiding over the
increasingly unjust exercise of taxation as globalization erodes the foundational principles of the
income tax).
8. I use the term “mercenary” here to connote the negative casting by various academics and
governmental institutions of certain tax competition practices by states and their financial
institutions. For further discussion see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998); Vito Tanzi, Globalization and the Work of Fiscal
Termites, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2001, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/tanzi.htm;
Richard Hay, OECD Report on ‘Level Playing Field’ Imminent, 9 MANAGING PARTNER 1, 1 (2006)
(stating that the OECD’s project threatens to “shut non-cooperating international financial centers
out of the world’s banking and securities markets” in violation of “[a] longstanding principle of
international law [that] limits taxing rights to those which a country can enforce without the need for
assistance from others”); Lawrence Speer, Conservative Think Tanks Attack OECD on Offshore Tax
Scrutiny During Forum, DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 15, 2005, at G-3 (2005) (reporting description of the
anti-tax havens campaign as “hypocritical,” “a thinly disguised move by industrialized countries
toward forced harmonization of tax policies at the global level,” and an attempt to create “‘a new tax
cartel’”); Daniel J. Mitchell, An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition Would Mean Higher
Taxes and Less Privacy, 1395 BACKGROUNDER 1, 18 (2000), available at http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2000/09/oecd-proposal-to-eliminate-tax-competition (OECD project “an attack on
sovereignty”); Jinyan Li, Tax Sovereignty and International Tax Reform: The Author’s Response, 52
CAN. TAX J. 141, 146 (“External forces may make a country give up its sovereignty. One example is
the OECD-led harmful tax competition campaign.”). I discuss the troublesome aspects of casting
some practices—but not others—in this moralistic light in Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation
and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99, 115–16 (2009) (“OECD rhetoric is susceptible to
interpretation as little more than a means to mask or legitimize what is essentially an illegitimate use
of political or economic force to achieve the aims of the powerful against those of the weak.”).
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mercenary behavior against other nations in order to capture as much global
capital as possible, even if such action deprives other nations of revenue.9
The story of FATCA and EITI in the United States is the story of a
virtually pathological internal struggle on the question of whether and how
to promote or prevent mercenary behavior, both within and beyond the state.
Each reform represents an attempt to curb the mercenary instincts of foreign
states and opportunistic U.S. taxpayers. FATCA tries to accomplish this
goal by exerting control over foreign financial institutions, while EITI does
so by exerting it over U.S. multinationals. This section describes the
mercenary tendency and how FATCA and EITI respond in turn.
A. Tax Competition and the Mercenary Tendency of the Tax State
One way of looking at the post-Westphalian world is as a society of
nations, divided along territorial lines, which are in direct competition with
each other for the world’s resources but enlightened enough to work with
each other to prevent total war. In such a world, nations bind themselves
and one another to the mast in international agreements with the intention of
preventing the unwanted scenario of total destruction, but then engage in
everyday acts of sabotage against these binds in order to advance their own
interests at the expense of others.10 In taxation, the tendency toward this
“agree in form, defect in practice” behavior is manifested in the means by
which states create and manipulate for their own benefit an evolving set of
international standards and norms (sometimes but not always of their own
making) around a global flow of information about economic resources and
their owners.11 Strategies that work to interrupt that flow to serve national

9. See, e.g, Adam Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV 923
(2010).
10. See Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S61 (2002)
(demonstrating how interest groups, especially national legislators and powerful taxpayers,
consistently undermine global tax harmonization efforts in order to promote their own social and
economic positions); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 280–81 (2001) (arguing that
according to the logic of democracy, nations should prioritize their own interests, rather than engage
in any campaign to seek global tax justice); Tsilly Dagan, National Interests in the International Tax
Game, 18 VA. TAX REV. 363 (1998) (stating that since global coordination and cooperation are
virtually impossible to attain, nations should maximize their own long-term welfare).
11. See Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407 (2012); Michael McIntyre,
How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 255, 255 (2009), available
at
http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/mcintyre/text/mcintyre_articles/Treaties/
charade_56TNI.pdf
(describing current information sharing agreements as ineffective in design and in practice,
delivering nothing more than “an undeserved patina of respectability” in the form of symbolic
cooperation); Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax
Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV. 155 (2007) (suggesting that cooperation in tax matters might serve longterm national interests, but defecting definitely serves short-term ones).
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interests, especially in the name of competition, have been portrayed as
appropriate and even justice-oriented by prominent tax scholars.12
In such a world, using national competitiveness as a normative
benchmark for a regulatory scheme can easily translate into advocacy for
mercenary behavior by the state. This is illustrated in statements like those
made by Congressman Paul Ryan in 2011:
[W]e need to have a tax system that makes America a haven for
capital formation. Let’s make this country a tax shelter for other
countries instead of having other countries be a tax shelter for
America. This would ultimately raise revenues and promote
economic growth.13
The message is clear that although eradicating American tax evasion is a
worthy goal for the state, facilitating tax evasion is the better strategy when
it comes to foreign taxpayers and their home states. The sentiment is echoed
in statements by legislators who oppose changing United States tax reporting
rules on interest to ensure that the United States informs foreign countries
about income earned by their taxpayers through United States financial
institutions. For example, in opposition to a proposed expansion of such
reporting in 2003, then-Senator Gordon Smith expressed his failure to
understand “why we put the enforcement of other nations’ tax laws as a
priority at Treasury,” and urged the Treasury not to “drive the savings of
foreigners out of bank accounts in the United States and into bank accounts
in other nations.”14 Private sector advocates similarly argue that interest
reporting would “hinder tax competition between nations” and “help
oppressive governments track down flight capital.”15

12. For example, Michael Graetz cites John Rawls’s Law of Peoples for the proposition that
seeking advantage must take priority over cooperation since “we regard our obligation for the wellbeing of our fellow citizens as more pressing than for people in need elsewhere in the world.” See
Graetz, supra note 10, at 277–78. Rawls’ critics contest this assertion on the ground that there is no
morally sound foundation for making such a claim and that the claim itself is contradicted in Rawls’
own writings. See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, JOHN RAWLS: HIS LIFE AND THEORY OF JUSTICE
(Michelle Kosch trans., 2007).
13. Geoffrey Gabor, Inside The Budget Battle with Congressman Paul Ryan, TJE AM. BUS.
MAG. (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.americanbusinessmag.com/2011/08/inside-the-budget-battle-withcongressman-paul-ryan/.
14. Interest Reporting, Smith, Inhofe Urge Treasury to Reconsider Nonresident Alien Interest
Reporting Rules, DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 20, 2003, at 8, 9 (concerning proposed non-resident alien
interest reporting rules).
15. Letter from Senator Gordon H. Smith to John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury (Feb. 13,
2003), available at http://archive.freedomandprosperity.org/ltr/smith-irs/smith-irs.pdf.
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National competitiveness also translates into a complementary form of
mercenary behavior by the state—namely, the aggressive use of tax rate and
base competition to entice multinational businesses. The former is well
documented: corporate tax rates are in a clear and steady downward trend
globally.16 The latter, consisting of tax incentives, holidays, credits, and
special deals for inbound investment, is less quantifiable in terms of size and
impact but no less clearly a global trend.17 Together, rate and base
competition constitute another form of the race to the bottom, a beggar-thyneighbor contest that leaves states worse off than they might be if they
cooperated in setting—and adhering to—baseline standards for minimal
taxation of business.18
Competitiveness, however, cannot be easily dismissed as a national
goal, even if it does promote various forms of mercenary behavior by the
state. It must be readily acknowledged that the United States is just one
country that must compete with all others for a share of global resources,
including global capital.19 The U.S. has in many ways been a leader in

16. See, e.g., Eoin Callanin Washington, Greenspan Warns on Borrowing Costs, FIN. TIMES,
July 27, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0c5556fa-3bd9-11dc-8002-0000779fd2ac.html (quoting
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan: “Other nations have seen the results of the bold
tax reforms enacted by the U.S. in the 1980s and they have moved to follow our example. And with
much of the world having reduced their corporate rates, we now have the second highest statutory
corporate tax rate among OECD nations.”); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Treasury Releases Business
Taxation and Global Competitiveness Background Paper 36 (July 24, 2007), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/07230%20r.pdf (“Since 1980, the
United States has gone from a high corporate tax-rate country to a low-rate country (following the
Tax Reform Act of 1986) and, based on some measures, back again to a high-rate country today
because other countries recently have reduced their corporate tax rates . . . . The evolution of OECD
tax rates over the past two decades suggests that [corporate income tax] rate setting is an interactive
game subject to the pressures of international competition.”); Henry M. Paulson Jr., Our Broken
Corporate Tax Code, WALL STREET J., July 19, 2007, at A15 (“Over the past two decades,
while . . . our statutory corporate income tax rate has increased, other nations have been reducing
their rates to replicate our miracle . . . . It’s not surprising then, that average OECD corporate tax
rates have trended steadily downward.”).
17. Because tax incentives take a number of different forms and may often be hidden in
expenditure budgets and policies that are not explicitly tax-related, it is difficult to count or measure
their existence and impact. There are already many regimes that use such non-rate incentives and
the use of these indirect means appears to be growing. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Global Trends
and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least Developed Countries, 42 U.B.C. L. REV. 239 (2010);
Herbert Jauch, Export Processing Zones and the Quest for Sustainable Development: A Southern
African Perspective, 14 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 101 (2002).
18. That is not to say that all states would be better off in such a world, since that is obviously
not the case. For a discussion see Adam Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS.
L. REV. 717 (2012).
19. See, e.g., DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MAPPING GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS: FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Financial%20Markets/Mapping%20glo
bal%20capital%20markets%20-%20Fifth%20annual%20report/MGI_Mapping_capital_markets_fift
h_annual_report.ashx; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, at ix (November 30, 2006), available at
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creating this competition, but it does not act independently of other
countries. For example, the U.S. adoption of the portfolio interest
exemption is credited with an immediate tidal wave of capital flight out of
Latin America into the U.S. financial system and was followed by a global
trend against portfolio income taxation.20 But the U.S. portfolio exemption
was itself a response to similar exemptions in the Eurobond market.21
Similarly, the U.S. rules that allow multinational businesses to defer
(indefinitely) any income taxes in the U.S. create the conditions for global
tax rate and base competition by other countries.22 Since other countries
have adopted similar deferral rules, any proposed change of course in the
U.S. could put the U.S. at an instant disadvantage internationally.23
Despite the inescapable fact of competition, the U.S. cannot afford to
completely destroy its income tax base in a race to the bottom. It is a
developed country whose citizens demand a certain level of government
services, and these services must be paid for, generally with tax revenues
collected more or less from its own taxpayers.24 The evidence of a century

http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (“[T]he United States
is losing its leading competitive position as compared to stock markets and financial centers
abroad.”); Down on the Street, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25,
2006, http://www.economist.com/
node/8316406; Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn From
London, WALL STREET J., Nov. 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116234404428809
623.html.
20. See, e.g., VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 130–31 (1995) (By 1993,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, and the UK
exempted foreign-owned interest earned from domestic bank accounts); see also Mitchell B. Weiss,
International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99, 108
(2001) (“[N]ot surprisingly, one country after the next responded in kind, introducing measures that
not only discouraged the outbound migration of their country’s capital, but also encouraged the
importation of large amounts of capital from higher-taxing jurisdictions. Some countries created
tax-exempt domestic investment opportunities; some relaxed their enforcement efforts; but most
followed the U.S.’s lead, exempting their withholding tax on imported interest income and
substantially cutting their corporate and individual tax rates.”).
21. See Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in
Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 377
(2009).
22. See J. Clifton Fleming et al., Worse Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009).
23. See J. Clifton Fleming et al., Some Perspectives from the United States on the Worldwide
Taxation vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, J. AUSTRALASIAN TAX TCHRS. ASS’N, Dec. 2008, at 35.
24. Of course, the U.S.—like any other country—imposes tax on foreign persons who invest in
the country. See e.g., I.R.C. § 871–885. However, the revenue raised from foreign persons is
minuscule compared to that raised from U.S. persons. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL
RETURNS 2005, at 15–18 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05inalcr.pdf (noting that
2005 domestic individual returns totaled approximately $935 billion); SCOTT LUTTRELL, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., FOREIGN RECIPIENTS OF U.S. INCOME 2007, at 121 (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10winbulforeignreceps.pdf (noting that 2005 foreign individual U.S.
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of taxation in the modern state suggests that these taxpayers demand at least
the patina of fairness in the taxes they are willing to accept.25 Blatant
shirking of tax obligations, perhaps especially by those most able to bear the
burden of taxation, is an assault on taxpayer morale that will eventually lead
to the destruction of the entire tax system via noncompliance.26 Thus, even
those who advocate for mercenary policies, such as Paul Ryan, argue that
“there must be a decrease in the amount of tax shelters for people to park
their income overseas.”27 Moreover, as the world’s largest economy, the
United States may be one of only a few nations that can afford to restrict its
own pace in the race to the bottom in order protect the tax base—even if that
dulls its own edge in the global tax game. This leadership status does not
make the national discussion over taxation easy, as anyone following U.S.
tax policy over the past several years can readily attest.28

source withholdings via IRS form 1042S totaled approximately $10 billion); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., 2006 STATISTICS OF INCOME: CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2–3, 172–83 (2012),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06coccr.pdf (noting that 2006 domestic corporate returns
totaled approximately $353 billion while returns from foreign-controlled domestic corporations via
form 1120 totaled approximately $50 billion); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2003 CORPORATION
RETURNS:
RETURNS
OF
ACTIVE
CORPORATIONS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/03co10is.xls; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2003
CORPORATION
RETURNS:
RETURNS
WITH
NET
INCOME
(2012),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irssoi/03co11is.xls (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (noting that 2003
effective income tax receipts from foreign corporations with U.S. business operations via IRS form
1120-F totaled approximately $600 million).
25. See, e.g., TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE (Joseph Jacobs Thorndike & Dennis Ventry
eds., Urban Institute Press 2002). The fact that the United States remains the only developed
country in the world without a national sales tax may be attributed in part to the reluctance of the
U.S. population to accept what it perceives as a regressive tax. See, e.g., CARL DAVIS ET AL., INST.
ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS?: A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS
IN ALL 50 STATES 3–4 (3d ed. Nov. 2009), available at http://www.itepnet.org/whopays3.pdf (“Four
of the ten most regressive tax systems—those of Washington, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Nevada—rely very heavily on regressive sales and excise taxes.”); contra Paul Krugman, Why I’m
Soft
On
Sales
Taxes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
17,
2012,
5:38
PM)),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/why-im-soft-on-sales-taxes/. However, the omission
may be attributable to a general resistance to any new taxes, regardless of their perceived
distributional impact. See, e.g., Mervyn A. King, The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax, in THE
EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, 377, 379 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1987) (“There
is truth in the well-known adage that ‘an old tax is a good tax.’”).
26. See Itai Grinberg et al., Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence from Surveys and an
Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447 (2009); Bruno S. Frey & Benno
Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136 (2007) (noncompliance
by other taxpayers tends to decrease a taxpayer’s tax morale and compliance).
27. Gabor, supra note 13.
28. The recent debt ceiling and fiscal cliff standoffs are excellent examples of the nature of
debate surrounding fiscal matters in the U.S. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Obama to Ask for $1.2 Trillion
Increase in Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/
us/politics/obama-to-ask-for-1-2-trillion-increase-in-debt-limit.html; Robert Pear, Senate Vote
Approves Rise in Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/
politics/senate-approves-1-2-trillion-debt-limit-rise.html; Jonathan Weisman, Republicans Pledge
New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/us/
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FATCA and EITI emerge as evidence of the internal struggle over how
and to what extent the United States ought to move in the direction of
embracing or rejecting the mercenary tendency both in its own policymaking
and in that of its competitors. The passage of each reform suggests that
there is at least some significant constituency in the United States that
prioritizes protecting the income tax over blindly pursuing strategies that
will ultimately destroy it. In order to understand the potentially precedentsetting role these legal reforms play in redefining the right and the duty of
the nation state to regulate its taxpayers and their resources in a global
economy, we must consider what the rules do in technical terms as well as
what condition for change they were seen as necessary to fulfill when the
first Obama administration brought them into being.
B. Monitoring Taxpayers Through Third Party Reporting
FATCA came into force as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment Act (HIRE Act), which was signed into law by President
Obama on March 18, 2010.29 The HIRE Act was a jobs bill that included
payroll tax holidays and other credits for employers. FATCA was unrelated
to this purpose, but was included in the form of revenue-raising “Offset
Provisions.”30 This is a bit of a canard: although the Chair of the House

politics/gop-pledges-new-standoff-on-debt-limit.html; Helene Cooper, Obama and House
Republicans Offer Taste of Renewed Fight Over the Debt Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/us/politics/obama-presses-congress-to-act-on-his-priorities.htm
l; Jackie Calmes, Demystifying the Fiscal Impasse That Is Vexing Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/us/politics/the-fiscal-cliff-explained.html;
Jennifer
Steinhauer, Divided House Passes Tax Deal in End to Latest Fiscal Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/us/politics/house-takes-on-fiscal-cliff.html; The Fiscal
Cliff Deal: America’s European Moment, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2013, http://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21569024-troubling-similarities-between-fiscal-mismanagement-washington-andmess.
29. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111–147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW111publ147/pdf/PLAW-111publ147.pdf.
30. The placement as a revenue raiser tacked onto a bill aimed at unrelated objectives has been
viewed by opponents of FATCA as a sign that its passage was undertaken with some degree of
stealth. See, e.g., FATCA: The Empire Strikes Back, RECOVER PARTNERS BLOG (July 4, 2011),
http://www.recoverypartners.biz/blog/2011/07/04/fatca-the-empire-strikes-back/; Koshek Rama
Moorthi, FATCA: Obama’s New Year Surprise Against American Expats, EXAMINER (Nov. 30,
2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/fatca-obama-s-new-year-surprise-against-american-expats;
ACA’s Voice in the News, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD (Oct. 2012), http://americansabroad.org/news-andevents/aca-s-voice-in-the-news/. Although it may appear anomalous to observers from other
countries, the addition of unrelated riders and last minute addenda, especially revenue raisers, is a
standard feature of U.S. lawmaking. For a brief discussion of how reconciliation and pay-as-you-go
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Budget Committee claimed that the HIRE Act was a responsible piece of
legislation that was “fully paid for . . . by cracking down on overseas tax
havens,”31 in fact the relatively paltry sums projected to be raised under
FATCA could do little by way of offset, even if they had been implemented
right away.32
FATCA arose directly in response to publicity surrounding well-known
and venerable foreign institutions, most especially in Switzerland, that have
helped U.S. customers hide income and assets from the IRS.33 The publicity

rules and standards affect tax policymaking in the U.S. see Policy Basics: Introduction to the
Federal Budget Process, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-7-03bud.pdf. Presented as a revenue offset at the tail end of a long,
complex, and contested piece of legislation did allow FATCA to pass with minimal debate or
discussion in 2010. But the seeds for FATCA had been sown in earlier legislative attempts, both in
Senator Levin’s Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2009 and Senator Baucus’ stand-alone FATCA of
2009. See Summary of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2011, CARL LEVIN (July 12, 2011)
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/summary-of-the-stop-tax-haven-abuse-act-of2011/; H.R. 3933 (111th): Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US (Oct. 27,
2009), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3933; see also Douglas Shulman, Prepared
Remarks of Commissioner Douglas Shulman Before the 22nd Annual George Washington University
International
Tax
Conference
(Dec.
10,
2012)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Prepared-Remarks-of-Commissioner-Douglas-Shulman-before-the-22nd—
Annual-George-Washington-University-International-Tax-Conference)
(stating
that
“the
Administration and the IRS are focused on a multi-year international tax compliance strategy . . . to
put a serious dent in offshore tax evasion” and expressing support for the FATCA Act of 2009).
31. 156 CONG. REC. H1152 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2010) (statement of Sen. Allyson Schwartz),
(“[T]he HIRE Act is fully paid for and it does not add to the annual deficit. It is paid for by cracking
down on overseas tax havens.”).
32. See 156 CONG. REC. S2369–70 (April 9, 2010), (daily ed. April 15, 2010) (enclosure
provided by of Douglas Elmendorf) (showing that the HIRE Act was expected to produce a revenue
deficit in the amount of $4,380,000); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Letter and Table Outlining Budgetary
Effects of HIRE Act, (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/112xx/doc11230/hr2847.pdf (showing amounts expected to be raised by FATCA provisions
as $343 million, $448 million, and $710 million, for 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively). That
precarious budgetary situation was aggravated by the fact that while the spending provisions of the
HIRE Act were immediately implemented, most of the FATCA provisions have yet to be enforced.
For example, the disclosure of U.S. accounts by foreign financial institutions was, according to the
statute, to begin after December 2012, but the enforcement has been delayed by the Treasury since
regulations interpreting the statute were not finalized until January, 2013. See Hiring Incentives to
Restore Employment Act §§ 501–502 (giving the original implementation schedule); I.R.S. Notice
2012-42 (Oct. 24, 2012) (which delays the implementation of information reporting until March 31,
2015 and gross withholding until January 1, 2017); see also DLA PIPER, COMPARISON OF FATCA
TIMEFRAMES (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Taxnews-Chart__Oct2012.pdf.
33. See William McGurn, Obama’s IRS Snoops Abroad, WALL STREET J., July 16, 2012,,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303933704577531280097324446.html
(“David
Axelrod invoked the holy grail behind the FATCA led, global IRS expansion. ‘We lose $100 billion
a year to offshore tax shelters,’ Mr. Axelrod told CNN.”). For background information on base
erosion via offshore holdings see David Voreacos, Offshore Tax Scorecard: UBS, Credit Suisse,
HSBC, Julius Baer, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 12, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/201110-12/offshore-tax-scorecard-ubs-credit-suisse-hsbc-julius-baer.html; Kim Dixon, Nearly 15,000
Americans
Admit
Offshore
Tax
Cheating,
REUTERS
(Nov.
17,
2009),
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continues, reinforcing the need for the protection of the U.S. tax base against
erosion through criminal activity.34 Thus FATCA is cast in a defensive role
against the potential mercenary behavior of foreign states that provide the
regulatory cover for U.S. taxpayers to evade their tax obligations at home.
The sponsors and supporters of FATCA have stated a persuasive case
for the expansion of IRS efforts against mercenary behavior, namely, the
blatant efforts of foreign banks to deliberately seek out American elites and
help them evade their tax obligations to the United States.35 As Senator Carl
Levin explained:
The reason for this strong approach was seen dramatically in
hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. A
July 2008 hearing, for example, showed how two foreign banks,
UBS AG of Switzerland and LGT Bank of Liechtenstein, used a
variety of secrecy tricks to help U.S. clients open foreign bank
accounts and hide millions of dollars in assets from U.S. tax
authorities. One 2004 UBS document indicated that 52,000 U.S.
clients had Swiss accounts that had not been disclosed to the IRS.
UBS estimated that those hidden accounts contained a total of about
$18 billion in cash, securities, and other assets. In order to defer a
criminal prosecution against the bank by the U.S. Department of
Justice, UBS admitted that it had participated in a scheme to
defraud the United States of tax revenues, paid a $750 million fine,
and agreed to stop opening accounts that are not disclosed to the
IRS. UBS also agreed to reveal the names of a limited number of
U.S. accountholders, although the bulk of the 52,000 still may

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AG3IU20091117; Martin Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide
Hundreds of Billions in the Caymans, TAX NOTES, May 24, 2004, at 96; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Department of Justice Asks Court to Serve Summons for Offshore Records (Apr. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-tax-349.html (“Some United States
taxpayers are evading billions of dollars per year in United States taxes through the use of offshore
accounts”).
34. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, South Florida Woman Pleads Guilty to
Failing to Disclose Income from Swiss Bank Accounts and Agrees to $21 Million Penalty (Jan. 8,
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-tax-030.html (“‘The Justice
Department continues to pursue those who hide income and assets from the IRS through the use of
nominee businesses and offshore bank accounts,’ said Assistant Attorney General Keneally. ‘U.S.
taxpayers who fail to come forward in the voluntary disclosure program risk prosecution and
substantial fines, as this case demonstrates.’”).
35. CONG. REC. S1746 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“Section 531
ends shenanigans involving U.S. persons . . . .”).
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escape U.S. tax enforcement actions due to Swiss secrecy laws that
continue to conceal their identities.36
Accordingly, FATCA’s central goal is “rooting out individuals hiding
their money in bank secrecy jurisdictions.”37 This is to be accomplished by
imposing new reporting requirements on foreign financial intermediaries
serving U.S. persons. Because these foreign financial intermediaries are not
themselves U.S. persons, FATCA is enforced via a gross basis 30%
withholding tax on any payment made to any foreign financial institution
(expansively defined) that does not comply with U.S. reporting
requirements.38 In broad strokes, compliance involves identifying any
customer that may be a U.S. person, and either reporting details about their
financial activities directly to the IRS or closing their accounts. Failure to
comply on an ongoing basis will result in 30% withholding of any U.S.
source payment to the foreign financial institution.39
FATCA thus contemplates the tracing of virtually every payment of
U.S. source income to an ultimate owner, with various exceptions involving
public companies, central banks, and other institutions.40 This imposes
enhanced information gathering and withholding requirements on virtually
all payors of U.S. source income, wherever they are located. It is an
enormous and ambitious project in terms of data production, gathering,
filtering, and transmission, as well as in terms of creating the legal means by
which foreign entities can directly report to the IRS despite domestic
financial privacy and confidentiality laws that would otherwise obstruct such
information flows. As with most legislation, difficult problems arose as the
IRS and the targeted institutions began to implement the regime and U.S.
taxpayers began to understand the ramifications of the legislation, especially
on the over six million U.S. citizens who reside permanently in other
Some of these unresolved difficulties have delayed
countries.41

36. CONG. REC. S1745 (Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
37. Shulman, supra note 30.
38. See I.R.C. § 1471 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-208).
39. See Id.
40. See id. § 1473(3) (entities not subject to withholdable payments include publicly traded
companies and their affiliated corporations, individual retirement plans and 501(a) organizations,
U.S. and state agents and their assets, REITs, RICs, and certain exempt trusts).
41. The U.S. Department of State estimates that there are 6.3 million American citizens living
abroad. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO: CONSULAR
AFFAIRS BY THE NUMBERS (July 2012), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ca_fact_sheet.pdf.
These citizens, along with anyone holding a certificate of permanent residency in the U.S. (for whom
no count is estimated), are experiencing increasingly restricted financial account access in their
countries of residence. See, e.g., Americans Residing Overseas Are Denied Bank Accounts, ASS’N
OF AMS. RESIDENT OVERSEAS, http://aaro.org/denied-bank-accounts (observing that foreign
financial institutions are closing, threatening to close, or refusing to open accounts for residents with
U.S. status, even if they are citizens of the country in which they seek to have accounts).
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implementation, and continue to garner criticism.42 These issues and
potential avenues to solution are discussed in Part IV, below.
C. Empowering Civil Society Through Transparency
EITI addresses a different but related question involving international
tax planning and offshore jurisdictions. The focus of EITI is international
tax avoidance by multinationals, but not primarily to protect the U.S. tax
base (although it could certainly have that effect in the future). Rather, EITI
is aimed at curbing the potential for U.S. multinationals to engage in or
facilitate corrupt practices by foreign governments in resource-rich but
economically poor countries.43
The roots of the U.S. legislation rest in a global movement that began
more than a decade ago, when an international resource industry watchdog
group identified the global under-taxation of multinational companies in the
extractive sector as a key component of corruption and development failure
in resource-rich countries. The group called for transparency as a remedy, to
be launched and monitored through voluntary participation by governments
and multinational companies. EITI grew to encompass a number of
participants, and led to pressure on governments to adopt “Publish What
You Pay” (PWYP) principles in line with EITI standards.44

42. See, e.g., Scratched by the FATCA: Congress Creates a Bureaucratic Nightmare for Fund
Managers, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21540270; David Jolly &
Brian Knowlton, Law to Find Tax Evaders Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/business/law-to-find-tax-evaders-denounced.html.
43. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 110TH CONG., THE PETROLEUM AND
POVERTY PARADOX: ASSESSING U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO FIGHT THE
RESOURCE CURSE (Comm. Print Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT110SPRT44727/pdf/CPRT-110SPRT44727.pdf (“Too often, oil money that should go to a nation’s
poor ends up in the pockets of the rich, or it may be squandered on the trappings of power and
massive showcase projects instead of being invested productively and equitably. In some countries,
national poverty has actually increased following the discovery of oil. This ‘‘resource curse’’ affects
us as well as producing countries. It exacerbates global poverty which can be a seedbed for
terrorism, it dulls the effect of our foreign assistance, it empowers autocrats and dictators, and it can
crimp world petroleum supplies by breeding instability. . . . This report argues that transparency in
revenues, expenditure and wealth management from extractive industries is crucial to defeating the
resource curse.”); see also Susan Ariel Aaronson, Oil and the Public Interest, VOX (July 12, 2008),
http://www.voxeu.org/article/can-transparency-extractive-industries-break-resource-curse
(“[O]il
cravings fund and perpetuate undemocratic regimes in many energy-exporting countries. . . . EITI
can change the behaviour of oil exporters without conditionality or force. It empowers reformist
interests in resource-rich countries and effectively acts as an incentive for oil company executives
and petro-state policymakers to change their behaviour.”).
44. See Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY,
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/ activities/advocacy/extractive-industries-transparency-initiative
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Like FATCA, EITI was enacted as an add-on to an unrelated bill after
failing passage as a stand-alone act. In this case, the legislation emerged in
the form of a two-page addendum to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act
of 2010, a bill aimed at addressing the causes of the financial crisis.45 The
reform had previously been submitted to Congress in the form of the Energy
Security through Transparency Act of 2009,46 but failed after extensive
lobbying by the U.S. oil and gas industry.47 Again, like FATCA, the
inclusion of EITI in a long, complex, and contested bill ensured its passage
with relatively little debate and discussion; indeed, commentators suggested
that the extractive industry was completely caught by surprise when it
discovered that EITI had passed.48
The effect of EITI was to revise and expand SEC rules for the disclosure
of corporate tax payments by targeted companies. Under the legislation,
extractive industries would report more information about their global
corporate structures, intercompany transactions, and payments of any kind of
tax to all foreign governments. EITI thus supplemented an existing
international regime that attempts to prevent corporate bribery of elected
officials, which is codified in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA).49 EITI, however, is broader than the FCPA in that the latter was
intended to end illegal payments of bribes, kickbacks, and the like to
government officials, while EITI focuses on all payments to foreign
governments, including legal ones.
The idea behind EITI is to expose worldwide corporate tax payments for
two reasons: first, to ensure that the recipient governments are honest with
their own peoples about revenues under their control; and second, to expose
the effect of global tax competition on revenues. The first goal explicitly
aims at accountability in foreign state governance: the targets are

(last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2010) (enacted). For the regulations associated with this section see Disclosure of Payments by
Resource Extraction Issuers, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249 (2010); see also Cardin-Lugar Amendment,
supra note 3.
46. Energy Security through Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009).
47. See Ken Silverstein, As Oil Pours Into Gulf, Oil Industry Fights Anti-Corruption Measure,
HARPERS (May 11, 2010), http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/as-oil-pours-into-gulf-oil-industry-fightsanti-corruption-measure/ (explaining the opposition of the American Petroleum Institute, a trade
association that represents the U.S. oil and gas industry).
48. See Daniel Firger, Lifting the Resource Curse: Will Dodd-Frank Do the Trick?,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
28,
2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danielfirger/post_945_b_741761.html; Rebekah J. Poston & Carine M. Williams, ‘Extraction and
Compliance: New Reporting Requirements for Issues Involving Oil, Natural Gas or Minerals’,
COMPLINET (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.squiresanders.com/files/Publication/0dba74ce-32ba-40f9973b-a13fa624b222/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/21d007b3-af8b-4068-9110-1ae23dcf2ed6/
Article-Poston_Williams-FCPA-Extraction.pdf.
49. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).

1386

12 CHRISTIANS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 1373, 2013]

5/16/13 9:09 AM

Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

unscrupulous officials who may divert payments meant for national revenues
to their own private offshore accounts. The second is an indirect response to
perceptions among various activist groups that income tax systems of rich
countries are becoming increasingly generous to multinationals and elites,
and in turn increasingly burdensome on the working class in societies across
the globe.50
As in the case of FATCA, the sponsors and supporters of EITI stated the
case for corporate tax transparency forcefully and with conviction by casting
it in terms of U.S. interests. The argument is that Americans have an interest
in knowing precisely what our public companies pay in fees, taxes, fines,
and other payments, to all of the governments of all of the nation-states in
which they operate.51 Failing to disclose this information on a global basis
both distorts the decisions of U.S. stakeholders and encourages multinational
companies to engage in behavior that would not be supported by a knowing
public.
The accountability sought in EITI made an important step toward
corporate tax transparency, but like FATCA, EITI also fell short of its
potential. It did so not by being too broad in drawing its target for reform,
but rather the converse, by restricting itself to one industry, albeit one with
documented issues of corruption in foreign governance efforts. EITI has
demonstrated that American shareholders and a broad range of stakeholders
have good reasons to want accountability and transparency in the fiscal
affairs of their public companies, in all sectors. The arguments made for
transparency in the extractive sector could and should be marshaled to
expand EITI to require corporate tax disclosure by all public companies, in
all industries.
However, as in the case of FATCA, opponents of corporate tax
transparency have raised objections that have impeded the implementation

50. See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor? 14 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 24 (2011).
51. See, e.g., Our Activities: United States, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY,
http://www.pwypusa.org/our-activities/us (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (describing the movement in
support of EITI legislation in the U.S.); Ben German, Sens. Cardin, Lugar Slam Oil Industry’s
Dodd-Frank Lawsuit, HILL (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2wire/261495-sens-cardin-lugar-slam-oil-industry-dodd-frank-lawsuit
(“The
Cardin-Lugar
Amendment puts transparency—the key to citizens’ ability to hold their government to account—
ahead of corruption. To do otherwise is a losing proposition for the United States and company
shareholders . . . .”); SUSAN SYMONS ET AL., PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, TAX TRANSPARENCY
FRAMEWORK: A REVIEW OF THE TAX COMMUNICATIONS OF THE LARGEST LISTED COMPANIES IN
BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND UK (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.pwc.be/en/publica
tions/total-tax-framework-pwc-08.pdf.
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of EITI and may ultimately destroy it, as well as any chance for its future
expansion. Immediately after EITI’s passage became news, the oil and gas
industry in the U.S. engaged in an aggressive campaign to prevent the
implementation of the law by forestalling the issuance of necessary
regulations, which were due to be in place by April 17, 201152 but only
emerged on August 22, 2012.53 Failing to prevent the issuance of those
regulations, industry representatives filed a lawsuit against the SEC to
eliminate the law in its entirety.54 The complainants include associations
whose members have publicly expressed support for EITI as a voluntary
initiative.55 The issues raised by these opponents and their impact on EITI’s

52. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1504(2)(A), 15
U.S.C.A. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-209), (“Information required . . . Not
later than 270 days after the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, the Commission shall issue final rules . . . .”); Christopher M Matthews, Lawmakers
Pressure SEC on Dodd-Frank Extractive Provisions, WALL STREET J. BLOG (June 25, 2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/06/25/lawmakers-pressure-sec-on-dodd-frankextractive-provisions/ (“In a letter sent Friday to SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro, 58 lawmakers
said they were concerned that the Commission had missed the April 17, 2011, statutory deadline for
the provisions’ final rules.”).
53. See Disclosure of Payment by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 3467717 (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67717.pdf.
54. Complaint, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, No. 12-1398 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 10, 2012), available
at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/sec-and-governance/api-v-sec/ Complain
t-American-Petroleum-Institute-v-SEC-12-1398-DC-Cir-Oct-10-2012.pdf.
55. For example, ExxonMobil has expressed support for EITI but opposes the Dodd-Frank
provisions on the grounds they will impede the competitiveness of American companies in the
global
market.
See
ExxonMobil,
About
Us:
Transparency,
EXXONMOBIL.COM,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/ about_issues_transparency.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013)
(“ExxonMobil has actively participated in Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since
its inception in 2002 at both the secretariat and country levels, including continuous participation on
the EITI board as either a primary or alternate member. . . . The Corporation is supporting the
application, validation, and membership processes of EITI participating countries False”); Ken
Cohen, Misguided SEC Transparency Rules Only Hurt American Companies, EXXONMOBIL.COM
(Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.exxonmobilperspectives.com/2012/10/26/misguided-sec-transparencyrules-only-hurt-american-companies/. Shell has expressed similar support for disclosure in principle.
See SHELL OIL, ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010, at 7 (2010), available at
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2010/servicepages/previous/files/all_shell_sr10.pdf (“In
the interests of transparency and accountability, we believe in the disclosure of revenues that
extractive industries pay to host governments.”). Yet Shell, along with ExxonMobil, is a member of
the American Petroleum Institute, the lead complainant in the EITI lawsuit. Jon Gingerich, The
Politics of Climate Change, O’DWYER’S MAG, (Feb. 2010), http://www.odwyerpr.com/editorial
/0201the-politics-of-climate-change.html (“API members include Chevron, ConocoPhillips,
ExxonMobil, GE, Halliburton and Shell.”); Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness
Condemns API Lawsuit to Strike Down Dodd-Frank Oil, Gas, and Mining Transparency Provision
(Oct. 12, 2012), available at, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-condemns-apilawsuit-strike-down-dodd-frank-oil-gas-and-mining-transparency (“API members, especially its
biggest and most influential players which include Chevron, BP, ExxonMobil and Shell, are using
API as a front to destroy this law.”). As explanation for these inconsistencies, the American
Petroleum Institute argues that it is not against disclosure in principle, but opposes “anticompetitive” regulation. See Carlton Carroll, API Files Court Challenge Against Costly, AntiCompetitive SEC Rule, AM. PETROLEUM INST. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.api.org/news-and-
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future are discussed together with those impeding the development of
FATCA in Part III, below.
III. WHAT ROLE FOR THE NATION STATE?
Having drawn a framework of a world in which states are drawn into
and at the same time threatened by mercenary behavior, FATCA and EITI
may seem obviously necessary to protect the claim of the state, as a matter
of right, to its income tax base. But, as a threshold matter, we cannot
identify either mercenary or protective behavior by the state unless we can
first assert that the state’s claim is appropriately and fairly made. In other
words, before we can assess the merits of any tax base-protecting scheme,
we must make the case that the tax base in question “belongs” in some
justifiable way to the claiming state.56 Only after staking a defensible claim
over people and resources can we then determine whether the state’s ability
to defend its claim is in fact threatened by globalization, and in turn how
particular legislative reforms assist or hinder that ability.
A. Drawing the Boundaries of the Tax State
One of the enduring problems for those who study international taxation
from a normative perspective is that states have constantly and consistently
failed to assert a comprehensively justifiable definition for the taxing
jurisdiction.57 This is perhaps not surprising when we see that the very
definition of jurisdiction as applied to the nation-state is a subject of great
controversy.58 Having failed in the initial definitional endeavor, states

media/news/newsitems/2012/oct-2012/api-files-court-challenge-against-costly-sec-rule.aspx (“‘The
oil and natural gas industry strongly supports payment transparency,’ said API President and CEO
Jack Gerard. ‘We’ve been working hard to increase transparency for a decade, but this rule could
interfere with ongoing efforts by making U.S. firms less competitive against state owned firms in
China and Russia that have no interest in transparency.’”).
56. This is a different question from that involving whether taxation is a fundamental aspect of
nationhood. That is, even if we decide that the exercise of taxation in general is a fundamental right
of sovereignty (a debatable proposition), we must still decide that the exercise of taxation in a
specific case is the right of a specific sovereign.
57. See Christians, supra note 7.
58. See CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 (Vaughan Lowe ed.,
2008) (“[D]efining jurisdiction is hardly self-evident. What is certain is that jurisdiction somehow
relates to sovereignty. . . . Jurisdiction becomes a concern of international law when a State, in its
eagerness to promote its sovereign interests abroad, adopts laws that govern matters of not purely
domestic concern. . . . The law of jurisdiction is doubtless one of the most essential as well as
controversial fields of international law, in that it determines how far, ratione loci, a State’s laws
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therefore consistently fail to solve problems caused when assertions made by
competing states overlap and conflict.59 This is again understandable:
defining the state’s jurisdiction over resources and people is not by any
means a straightforward task; moreover, it involves social, political, and
cultural understandings that defy quantifiable responses.60 The rightful
claim of the state over revenues (through taxation or otherwise) has been a
matter of vigorous contest throughout the history of the nation-state.61
Involving, as it does, an assertion of one jurisdiction as against all others in
the international society of states, any claim to a superior right to tax seems
fundamentally incompatible with a world in which people and resources are
subject to equally compelling claims with little but geopolitical power to
serve as arbiter.62
Tax policymakers have tried to address the problem of allocation
between equally legitimate claims by instituting prioritizing rules, under

might reach.”); B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV.
609, 609 (1966) (“[O]ne of the most difficult words in the legal lexicon to delineate is the term
‘jurisdiction’ . . . .”); Joseph H. Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241,
241 (1923) (deNning jurisdiction as “[t]he power of a sovereign to affect the rights of persons,
whether by legislation, by executive decree, or by the judgment of a court . . . .”); Christopher L.
Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1109 (1982) (deNning jurisdiction as the authority to affect legal interests); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (“‘Jurisdiction,’ it has been observed, is a word of many, too
many, meanings’ . . . .”) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). .
59. See Jack M. Mintz, National Tax Policy and Global Competition, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1285, 1288 (2001); RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 3 (describing his theory of “an overarching
principle of jurisdictional ‘reasonableness’, [that] takes into account the sovereign interests of States
other than the forum State (i.e., the State exercising its jurisdiction), yet which at the same time
ensures that the interests of the forum State and of the international community are sufficiently
heeded. A reasonable exercise of jurisdiction may alleviate the ‘extraterritorial’ impact of
jurisdictional assertions. . . .”).
60. See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment,
56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 817 (1956) (“The boundaries of the tax jurisdiction of the federal
government are here not limited by any legal lines. Instead, the assertion of jurisdiction is
essentially a matter of national policy and national attitudes as to the proper obligations of American
citizens and corporations in meeting the costs of government.”); Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as
Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375 (2006) (outlining the various and sometimes conflicting
rationales for establishing the tax jurisdiction and noting the potential international law violations
posed by various exertions of the jurisdiction beyond the physical territory of the state).
61. See, e.g., Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
PAPERS (W.F. Stolpher & R.A. Mugrave trans., 1953).
62. See, e.g., RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 8–9 (“The term ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ is often
used to condemn the long arm of US law. . . . The United States are perceived to champion a
geographically almost unlimited application of their own ‘exceptional’ legislation, a perception
which is stoked by US unilateralism in world politics. . . .”). Accordingly, it has been suggested that
a states’ right to tax is generally accepted as not exclusive but conjunctive. The principle may be
embedded in the international law concepts of comity and reciprocity. See, e.g., F.A. MANN,
FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1990) (stating that “[s]ince every State enjoys the
same degree of sovereignty, jurisdiction implies respect for the corresponding rights of other
States.”).
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which nations voluntarily cede their right to tax to others, according to a
loosely organized set of standards. This work began in 1920 with the
formation of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)—described as
“the organized private traders of the world,” who took it upon themselves to
draw up a framework for identifying a “primary” right to tax.63 In 1921, the
ICC adopted a resolution that the taxing jurisdiction turned on the nature of
the tax, with distinctions being made between “super” and “normal” taxes.64
However, the U.S. rejected this resolution and endorsed closer adherence to
the U.S. system, which assigned jurisdiction on two bases—namely, the
residence of the taxpayer and the source of the income.65 The U.S.
prioritized the latter over the former in the case of conflict.66 The ICC
synthesized the views of the U.S. and fourteen other countries and, in 1923,
produced a resolution in Rome; later that year, the League of Nations began
to take over the discussions relating to this issue and used the Rome
resolutions as a basis for discussion.67 The ICC continued to influence the
League throughout its work on tax issues,68 and it continues to heavily
influence the League’s successor body, the OECD, today.69
Today, the international tax order—if an order exists at all—continues
to be defined by the principles expressed in the early twentieth century,

63. Dominic Kelly, The International Chamber of Commerce, 10 NEW POL. ECON. 259, 260,
261 (2005), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/kelly/publications/global_
monitor/cnpe114469.pdf.
64. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONGRESS 9 (1921),
available at http://archive.org/download/brochure18inteuoft/brochure18inteuoft.pdf .
65. See Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and
Enterprises Abroad, 2 INT’L LAW. 692, 693–94 (1968).
66. See id.
67. For a recitation of this early history of the international tax order see Michael J. Graetz &
Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021
(1997).
68. See Kelly, supra note 63, at 261 (“Most noteworthy was the ICC’s involvement with the
World Economic Conference in May 1927, under the auspices of the League of Nations. . . . This
perception of inOuence very quickly became a source of irritation for other non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). For example, the direct representation of the ICC on the Economic
Consultative Committee of the League of Nations drew the following acerbic response from the
International Co-operative Alliance in May 1930: ‘Our attention has been drawn to the extraordinary
claims which have been publicly made that the organized private traders of the world had not only
succeeded in entrenching themselves at Geneva in the authorities of the League on a basis of
equality of voice and voting with the National Governments, but wielded such inOuence on behalf of
their clients—the capitalist private traders—that they practically dominated the situation and were
even able to repudiate their own National Governments.’”).
69. See Allison Christians, Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 1 (2010).
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which reside in an amorphous body of law, quasi-law, and non-law sources
that often resist clear categorization.70 The quasi-legal, quasi-ordered nature
of the international tax “regime” has led scholars to embrace pragmatic
solutions to international conflicts involving residence and source countries,
and to justify those solutions with various appeals to normative theories.71
All of the proposed theories have consistently failed to provide a normative
position that holds up under scrutiny.72 They have similarly failed to explain
how states actually behave, as opposed to aspirational assertions by
government officials.73 That has been a loss for international taxation in
many ways, perhaps not least of which is that it has served to foster
resignation among scholars to a world of self-serving decision-making by
states, with virtually no tools for addressing perceived violations of any
international order.74
Perhaps the clearest example of the lack of a definable order and the
concomitant lack of tools to detect or prevent jurisdictional violations arises
in the assertion by the United States of its tax jurisdiction over U.S. citizens
and holders of permanent resident status wherever they live.75 This assertion
of jurisdiction is readily acknowledged to violate the residence principle,
which is so ubiquitous internationally that it has been called “customary

70. See Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax Organization’
Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006);
Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. J. INT’L L. 325 (2007);
David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the
“International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 140–41 (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The David
R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System”, 53 TAX L.
REV. 167, 169 (2000).
71. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International
Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1336 (2001); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation
of International Income, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 148, 169 (1998); Steven A. Dean, More
Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax
Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 144 n.79 (2009) (explaining “the Lockean notion that governments
earn the right to collect tax revenues by providing the services that make the creation of the
underlying income possible”); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness
in International Taxation: The Ability-To-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV.
299, 307 (2001) (explaining benefits-based arguments).
72. See Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAX L. REV. 83
(2007).
73. See Allison Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case
Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639 (2005)
74. See Cockfield, supra note 70, at 139.
75. Staking an exclusive claim over a person based on domestic legal status, to the exclusion of
all other countries, is an example of the American exceptionalism that dominates the general
jurisprudence on national jurisdiction. See RYNGAERT, supra note 58. It is further complicated by
the fact that legal status may be defined for tax purposes in ways that conflict with other domestic
nationality laws. See Kirsch, supra note 60, at 377 (“It is now possible for an individual to be
treated as a citizen for tax purposes during a period when she is not a U.S. citizen under nationality
law.”).
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international law.”76 Yet the anomaly persists as an intractable and
unresolvable feature of the international tax landscape.77 The assertion is
commonly traced to a U.S. Supreme Court decision, Cook v. Tait,78 which
asserted that:
[T]he basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made
dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being
in or out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be
made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being
in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen
to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as
citizen.79
Because the jurisdictional question has not been resolved
internationally, there appear to be few means by which any kind of legal
challenge would stand against virtually any assertion of jurisdiction by the
U.S.—or, by extension, by any other country that might seek to broaden its

76. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 389
(2010); Kaufman, supra note 71, at 148, 169 (arguing that jurisdiction based on residence, and that
based on source, constitute “customary norms” if not quite customary international law).
International law scholars typically describe customary law as binding even on those states that had
no part in forming it, “because they choose to acknowledge its obligatory character.” INT’L LAW
ASS’N LONDON CONF., COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 33
(2000), available at www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61C4CA
30217F376. However, there is an exception for so-called “persistent objectors”—those who, before
a practice develops into a rule of general law, “persistently and openly” dissent from the rule. Id. at
27–29. It is debatable whether that describes the U.S., since its compliance efforts have been
sporadic in practice. However, the fact that the practice can be traced in legal form to the income tax
system of the Civil War in America suggests “persistent and open” dissent from any customary law
that defines jurisdiction based on residence.
77. Professor Avi-Yonah argues that in addition to failing any normative justification,
citizenship-based taxation is becoming a nuisance for the U.S. in terms of compliance. See AviYonah, supra note 76, at 11 (“The only way we can maintain the fiction that we actually tax most of
our nonresident citizens is by enacting complicated credit and exclusion provisions that are difficult
to administer and are frequently ignored in practice. For someone who acquired US citizenship by
being born here and has lived almost their entire life overseas, filing tax returns and complying with
[the Code] must be a highly unlikely proposition even if no tax burden would likely result. If we did
not tax nonresident citizens, we could abolish section 911. We could also abolish IRC section 877,
which has proven ineffective in deterring tax-motivated expatriations, and simply apply the new IRC
877A (the exit tax on expatriation) to individuals abandoning US residency, like most countries do.
Finally, we could give up on the ‘savings clause’ [sic] in our tax treaties, which we insist upon to
enable us to tax nonresident citizens but which we may well have to pay a price for in treaty
negotiations.”).
78. 265 U.S. 47 (1924)
79. Id. at 56.
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own jurisdictional reach.80 The best that can be offered for analytical
purposes is the theory of “jurisdictional reasonableness.” That theory asserts
that any basis of jurisdiction asserted by a forum state must “take into
account the sovereign interests of other states, yet at the same time ensure
that the interests of the forum state and of the international community are
sufficiently heeded.”81 The theory draws upon related international law
concepts, including principles of nonintervention and sovereign equality,
which try to ensure that states do not use their uneven geopolitical powers to
assert jurisdiction over affairs under the domain of other states.82 This in
turn implies that jurisdictional assertions should be studied to ensure they do
not create the means for economic coercion and intervention.83
It should be clear that any attempt, using these concepts, to restrict a
state’s jurisdictional claims would be difficult or impossible to resolve on
the merits, and that for now at least, geopolitical power remains the only
explanation for the assertion of tax jurisdiction by states. This sets the stage
for thinking about the state as generally unconstrained in any legal sense
from asserting virtually any jurisdictional reach. The tax state is thus a
matter of flexing political muscle, both domestically (in policy decision
making) and internationally (in implementing policy choices).
Within this paradigm, any particular state’s reach may be seen as

80. See, e.g., BRIAN J. ARNOLD, TAX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS, NON-RESIDENTS, AND
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES 7 (1991) (“A country’s legal authority to levy tax is effectively limited only by
practical considerations of enforcement and collection. Rules of public international law or domestic
constitutional law restrict a country’s jurisdiction to tax only in narrow, relatively insignificant
ways.”); see also SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION 307 (1992) (“From the
point of view of formal sovereignty, there is no restriction on a state’s right to tax, and it may be
exercised without regard to its effects on other states.”). Contra Kirsch, supra note 60, at 389–90,
407–08 (outlining how the exertion of citizenship-based taxation on persons who are not citizens as
defined under nationality laws violates both customary international law and the U.S. constitution).
If exerting citizenship-based taxation is merely a matter of administrative capacity, success in
implementing the FATCA regime may encourage other countries to follow the U.S. lead.
81. RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 3; see also Kirsch, supra note 60, at 390–93 (outlining
traditional bases for jurisdictional assertions and the reasonableness principle).
82. See Robert L. Muse, A Public International Law Critique of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
of the Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996), 30 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 207, 241–42 (1996–1997) (“Because each nation possesses exclusive
authority within its territory—but no authority within the territory of another—each nation is coequal in rights and status with other nations, regardless of disparities in economic or military
power.”).
83. See A. Bianchi, Extraterritoriality and Export Controls: Some Remarks on the Alleged
Antinomy Between European and U.S. Approaches, 35 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 366, 385 (1992)
(submitting that “principles of jurisdiction need to be studied in connection with other principles
such as the prohibition of economic coercion and intervention, the consideration of which could be
useful to set up standards of legitimacy for extraterritorial measures”). Human rights scholars seem
to come to similar conclusions in this regard. For a discussion of views see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 256–57 (2006) (noting
that even in cases of human rights violation, some of which have been extreme, forcible intervention
and economic sanction have been used “in a very small number of cases”).
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justifiable by one state but not another, according to each state’s
interpretation of prevailing international norms. Reuven Avi-Yonah has
argued that what is deemed appropriate changes over time through the
universal acceptance of practices by key states, especially the United
States.84 This suggests that the tax state amounts to little more than the
assertion of its power: what a state should or should not do becomes a
question of what a state can or cannot do as a matter of administrative
capacity and relative political might in the international community.
B. Is the Tax State Threatened by Globalization and Technological
Change?
If we conclude that there are apparently few or no legal limits to the
taxing jurisdiction of the state, the next question is whether the state is
otherwise constrained in its reach. There is no doubt that many or most
states are so constrained, mainly by the need to follow in the paths set by
other, more powerful states.85 But some nations are clearly leading the way
in international taxation. An important question for these states is therefore
whether they, too, are constrained to act in the face of economic
globalization. This may be framed as a question of whether leader states are
victims of the global order in which they find themselves, or whether they
are in fact or could be, if they chose, masters of such order.
In the international legal literature, the framing of the state as a potential
victim of globalization is an ongoing theme. Some authors cast the state as
an already weak regulatory institution that is steadily weakening against
globalization, which is in turn seen as an independent overwhelming force
beyond the control of the state.86 But an opposite view is equally
propounded that the state is the ultimate architect of globalization and
therefore inherently capable of exercising control over and within it,
including over people and their resources.87 International tax scholars seem
to fall in both camps, but there appears to be more support for the former

84. Avi-Yonah, supra note 76, at 34–37 (outlining key changes in approach to jurisdictional
reach in the taxation of income earned by United States persons through foreign entities).
85. See Christians, supra note 17; Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal
Transplantation, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D.
Donahue eds., 2000)
86. See GEORG SØRENSEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE: BEYOND THE MYTH OF
RETREAT (2003); HA-JOON CHANG, GLOBALISATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE ROLE OF
THE STATE (2004).
87. Id.
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view.88 We seem to have the distinct feeling in the tax community that the
state is losing its grip over people and resources, that ever more draconian
measures must be instituted to regain control, but that ultimately the state
will always fail in the face of creative and determined opposition to its rule.89
This generally pessimistic view frames the state in its exercise of
taxation in an essentially defensive position, ultimately failing to keep order
over people and resources that it should—in principle—control.90 That is the
idea conveyed by the use of terms like “erosion” to describe how planning
strategies undertaken by millions of individual actors, including—but not
limited to—tax evasion, impact the tax system as a whole.91 The challenge
for international tax law is to define the people and resources over which the
state can and should exercise control, in order to justify measures taken to
defend that right.
One response is that the U.S. jurisdiction to tax is curtailed by
globalization, because its citizens undertake transactions and activities in
places, and sometimes move themselves to places, that are beyond the reach
of the U.S. tax authority. That has been a common theme of tax scholarship
that predicts the erosion of the fiscal state due to avoidance and evasion by
taxpayers.92 Certainly, ample evidence in support of the proposition can be
marshaled from academic and media coverage of what now appears to be a
rampant epidemic of tax dodging by U.S. multinationals and wealthy
individuals.93
But both FATCA and EITI seriously undermine the notion that the U.S.
is threatened by globalization and technological change. Each regime, in
different ways, is an assertion by the U.S. that it not only has the
jurisdictional authority to trace its resources no matter where in the world
they are located, but that it also has the capacity to do so. If these assertions
are correct, then it cannot be said that the U.S. is defeated by globalization or
technological change as a matter of either legal reach or practical capacity,

88. See Phillip Genschel, Globalization and the Transformation of the Tax State, 13 EUROPEAN
REV. 53 (2005).
89. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International
Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1349 (2001) (arguing that states are losing control over
corporations and that this “will compel the transfer of national responsibility for the corporation
income tax to an international authority”).
90. See Robert T. Kurdle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will it Last?
Will it Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 37, 66–68 (2003–2004).
91. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (2013).
92. For a seminal argument see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the
Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
93. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Tax Activists and the Global Movement for Development
Through Transparency 15 n.70 (Univ. of Wis. Tax Law & Dev. Legal Studies Paper Series, Paper
No. 1193, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029055.
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but rather that in the past it has simply not exercised the full measure of its
ability to regulate.94 FATCA and EITI thus stand as evidence that the
decision of the state not to regulate—in the case of any state with
administrative capacity similar to that of the U.S.—must be attributed to
political choice rather than capacity.95
Under this rubric, FATCA and EITI introduce a new role for the state in
directly regulating people and institutions that are not necessarily within its
jurisdiction as traditionally understood. In the case of FATCA, the
perceived threat is that financial institutions, if left to their own devices, will
engage in tax base-eroding practices rather than tax base-protecting ones,
and that the only way to protect the tax base is to expand the state’s
oversight to any entity that provides services to people who are supposed to
be included in the tax base. Fishing expeditions, in the past dismissed as
inappropriate by the OECD,96 are the mainstay of this regime.97 In the case
of EITI, the target is U.S. multinationals with respect to their tax
relationships with foreign governments, and the perceived threat is that U.S.
companies will take advantage of weak foreign laws and lawmakers to
unfairly exploit people and resources in other countries in the absence of
external intervention.98
Both FATCA and EITI may be seen as expansionary policies,
broadening the nation-state’s regulatory jurisdiction in the face of its feared
decline under the twin pressures of globalization and technological
advancement.99 This is a significant development in the global tax order

94. One explanation for this may be that in the past, blanket account surveillance of a citizenry
would have been viewed as an unwarranted intrusion by the state. For example, the OECD clearly
and repeatedly proclaimed that it never intended the harmful tax practices project to sanction or
enable states to embark on “fishing expeditions.” OECD, HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 8,
at 10. Yet it has long been clear that sophisticated fishing expeditions would be the only way for
states to curb tax evasion, since “without them, the chance of an evader getting caught will likely
remain modest.” Robert Kudrle, The OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition Initiative and the Tax
Havens: From Bombshell to Damp Squib, 8 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1, 89 (2008).
95. See HA-JOON CHANG, supra note 86.
96. See Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, OECD
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/article26oftheoecdmodeltaxconventiononincomeandcapital.htm
(last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (“Countries are not at liberty to engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ or to
request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer.”).
97. Id. (amending the language of the article to require states to “exchange such information as
is foreseeably relevant”).
98. See Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource
Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 785, 828–29 (2012).
99. See Susan C. Morse, Taxation of Offshore Accounts: Ask For Help, Uncle Sam: The Future
of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529, 531–32 (2012) (“FATCA is a new solution to the
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given dire predictions about the continued efficacy of the state, bounded by
its territorial reach and administrative capacity, in regulating the affairs of
people and resources that are not so bounded.100 Most international tax
scholarship continues to suggest that states cannot act unilaterally to achieve
tax goals on a global basis due to legal and administrative barriers—that
cooperation is necessary to implement a comprehensive income tax base.101
But FATCA and EITI demonstrate that the U.S. (at least) has the capacity to
regulate people and resources to an extent that may have seemed
unimaginable not too long ago.102 The conclusion is that contrary to
conventional wisdom, a single state can in fact enforce a comprehensive,
worldwide income tax system.
C. How FATCA and EITI Re-Assert the U.S. Tax Jurisdiction
In the case of FATCA, the expansion of the U.S. regulatory jurisdiction
is being accomplished over both its own taxpayers and all the financial
institutions in the world that may serve them.103 The mechanism involves
new reporting and withholding provisions that apply directly to any
purveyor of U.S. source income to any U.S. person, wherever either such
party may be, anywhere in the world.104 This is both a rather startling
revelation of the U.S. capacity to manage data and an explicit rejection of
the century-old international practice of state-to-state information gathering
and exchange on a bilateral and, more recently, multilateral basis. It is also a
rejection of foreign financial privacy and confidentiality laws that prevent
financial institutions from disclosing information about clients and
customers beyond their own governments.105
The information-sharing regime has been slow to evolve and subject to
much criticism for its continued tolerance of privacy regimes that aid and
abet tax evasion around the world.106 The United States has taken
inconsistent positions on both financial privacy and the multilateral approach
to information sharing.107 This is evidenced by its initial contribution and

old problem of U.S. domestic taxpayers evading tax on their income from offshore accounts.”).
100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. See Morse, supra note 99, at 542 (“U.S. tax administrators can improve the chances of
FATCA’s success by seeking the cooperation and involvement of non-U.S. governments.”).
102. See Miranda supra note 98, at 828–29.
103. Morse, supra note 99, at 536–37.
104. See id.
105. See e.g., Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
(Can.); Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (U.K.).
106. See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.29–42 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Robert Kurdle, The OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition Initiative and the Tax
Havens: From Bombshell to Damp Squib, 8 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1, 1–18 (2008) (describing shifts in
OECD approach and U.S. reaction to the harmful tax practices project as it evolved).
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later outright rejection of OECD developments on the matter.108 It is also
evidenced by the long-standing practice of shielding U.S.-based information
that would help other countries enforce their own tax laws. When scandals
like UBS exposed the cooperative approach to information gathering and
exchange as a charade, FATCA may well have been viewed as the only
rational response to a public outraged by a relentless parade of international
tax evasion perpetuated by society’s wealthiest members.109
EITI’s expansion of corporate regulation presents another important
break from tradition.110 In supporting greater transparency of the foreign
fiscal affairs of U.S. multinationals in the resource extraction sector, EITI’s
supporters have argued that corporate shareholders are interested in knowing
what U.S. companies pay in taxes to other governments on a country-bycountry and even project-by-project basis.111 Stakeholders currently lack
access to this information due to existing rules that either safeguard the
confidentiality of tax information or otherwise introduce complexity in ways
that impede assessment of a company’s financial situation even when
information is publicly available.112 The confidentiality and complexity to
be overcome lies in legal disclosure standards that require multinationals to
publish only limited and piecemeal information about their operations.113
Furthermore, no one country requires multinationals to provide a globally
comprehensive picture of their geographic operations, inter-company
transfers, or tax payments.114 As a result, multinationals use various
complex financial strategies and multijurisdictional structures to locate profit
in ways that are often difficult (practically or politically) for their home or

108. See id.
109. See McIntyre, supra note 11, at 255.
110. But in this case, it is not a long tradition. There is precedent for disclosure of at least some
tax details in the United States, historically at the federal level but also based upon state practice.
Nationally, the public has had varying levels of access to tax information throughout U.S. history,
with current standards of confidentiality being the most restrictive. See Christians, supra note 93.
111. See Henry Lazenby, New SEC Rules Should Become International Standard—PWYP
Coalition, MINING WKLY. (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.miningweekly.com/article/newsec-rules-should-become-international-standard-pwyp-coalition-2012-08-23 (quoting a sustainability
analyst for an extractive industries investment company as saying “[w]e would be able to better
value companies if they are forced to be more transparent about their dealings . . . .”).
112. See Allison Christians, Do We Need to Know More About Our Public Companies?, 66 TAX
NOTES INT’L 843, 843–44 (2012).
113. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 762–70 (2011).
114. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Insight: Microsoft Use of Low-Tax Havens Drives Down Tax
Bill, REUTERS (July 27, 2011, 7:07 PM), www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-microsoft-taxidUSTRE76Q6OB20110727..
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headquarters countries to track, and all but impossible for the public to
monitor or understand.115
In this manner EITI, like FATCA, introduces a jurisdictional claim for
the state that collides with existing confidentiality and privacy laws. In this
case, the laws in question do not shield the taxpayer from the state—if they
so chose, states could already extract all of the EITI-related information
from public companies as part of their annual tax reporting requirements.
Instead, the privacy in question shields the global tax-planning activities of
multinational companies from the view of the public.116 The legal question
is whether this kind of information constitutes “[p]ublic business [that] is the
public’s business,” as to which the public has “the right to know.”117 The
passage of EITI answers this question in the affirmative, and therefore—
again in the same vein as FATCA—casts the state in the role of global
information extractor for the benefit of the public.118 In this case, the benefit
to the public is achieving information symmetry for market participants
instead of extracting revenues from would-be tax evaders.
EITI also breaks from a perhaps little-known national competitiveness
tradition that resides in the technical rules of the foreign tax credit regime.
The Treasury has explicitly commanded U.S. companies to attempt to
minimize their taxes in foreign countries; in fact, such attempts comprise a
condition of eligibility for foreign tax credits.119 This makes sense in terms

115. See RICHARD MURPHY, TASK FORCE ON FIN. INTEGRITY & ECON. DEV., COUNTRY BY
COUNTRY REPORTING: HOLDING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS TO ACCOUNT WHEREVER THEY
ARE (June 2009), available at www.financialtaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Final_CbyC
_Report_Published.pdf.
116. In the United States, for example, tax information is protected pursuant to federal statute,
with high penalties for disclosure. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2006). Canada has a similar rule. See Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, §§ 239(2.2), 241 (5th Supp.) (Can.). Certain persons who are deemed to
have a ‘material interest’ in a specific taxpayer’s return, such as, in the case of corporations, “any
bona fide shareholder of record owning 1 percent or more of the outstanding stock of such
corporation,” are entitled to obtain such returns. See I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1)(D)(iii). Public disclosure of
any information obtained under this exception is prohibited, even if lawfully obtained by the
shareholder. The prohibition cannot be overcome by freedom of information requests. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3) (2006) (articulating an exception from the Freedom of Information Act disclosure for
information otherwise protected by statute). See I.R.C. § 6103(a)(1). Placing reporting requirements
under securities compliance rules rather than within the tax code overcomes this problem. See, e.g.,
STEVEN MARK LEVY, How the FBAR is Used, in FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS,
BANKING, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES COMPLIANCE ch. 10.04 (rev. ed. 2011).
117. Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the
Pursuit of a Visible State 19 (Jan. 9, 2012) (unpublished), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1918154.
118. See supra Part III.C.
119. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1116, at 2 (2012), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1116.pdf (“Taxes paid to a foreign country that you do not legally
owe, including amounts eligible for refund by the foreign country. If you do not exercise your
available remedies to reduce the amount of foreign tax to what you legally owe, a credit for the
excess amount is not allowed.”).
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of revenue prorection since, by virtue of the foreign tax credit, the U.S.
collects tax only on a residual basis with respect to foreign source income
earned by U.S. persons.120 The residence-based tax the U.S. can collect on
such foreign source income is maximized to the extent the taxpayer
minimizes the source-based tax collected by the host government. This
observation suggests that U.S. companies and the U.S. government are
aligned in their focus to avoid paying tax to a foreign government whenever
possible.121
EITI changes that assumption by suggesting that the U.S. government
has a role in ensuring that U.S. multinationals pay an appropriate amount of
tax to the foreign countries in which they do business.122 What that
appropriate amount may be is hotly contested and is sure to become more so
once greater public disclosure takes place.123 But the underlying premise of
EITI is that market decisions depend on globally comprehensive reporting
and disclosure of the tax planning decisions undertaken by multinationals
and, importantly, that the state has a duty to extract such information from
its multinationals.124 Under EITI, the state will exercise that right by
requiring any specified company listed on a U.S. exchange to compile and
disclose extensive information about its inter-company agreements,
transactions, and payments, as well as payments by any of the companies in
the multinational group to any foreign government.125 Like FATCA, the
passage of EITI demonstrates that states not only have the right to extract
this kind of information, but that they have the duty to do so, and, in the U.S.
at least, that they have the capacity to do so.126

120. Id. (noting that the U.S. government gives tax credits to corporations paying taxes to foreign
governments).
121. Of course, the company facing residence-based taxation is indifferent with respect to which
country collects what portion of a tax. But by limiting access to foreign tax credits on the basis of
efforts to reduce tax in the source country, the U.S. aligns its multinationals with its own goal of
minimizing source-based tax. See id.
122. Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.
123. This information-enabled public discourse is a source of worry for multinational company
managers and advisors, who fear that the public is likely to misunderstand the disclosed information.
See, e.g., William Morris, Taxation and Development: Is Country-by-Country Reporting the
Answer?, OECD OBSERVER (Mar. 2010), http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3229/
Taxation_and_development.html.
124. See, e.g., MABEL VAN ORANJE & HENRY PARHAM, PUBLISHING WHAT WE LEARNED: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY COALITION (2009),
available at
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/sites/pwypdev.gn.apc.org/files/Publishing%20What%20We%20
Learned%20-%20EN.pdf.
125. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 249 (2012).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101.
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Perhaps the most important takeaway regarding the ability of legislators
to reassert a strong role for the state within the context of a global economic
system of its own making is that “[a]n indispensable step toward a truly
comprehensive system of world order is to disabuse all minds of the false
myth that universal words imply universal deeds.”127 The authors of those
words, the venerable scholars Myers McDougall128 and Harold Lasswell,129
sought a universal international law of human dignity, but it is not too much
of a stretch to fit the state’s assertion of tax on people within that rubric. It
is one thing to say that a particular regime is designed to lead to a
multilateral order that features fair treatment for all stakeholders, whether
that means safeguarding the tax base or eliminating information asymmetry
in the marketplace. Quite obviously, implementation will be the key, and, in
that measure, there is unfortunately reason for doubt.
Of particular note for the proponents of FATCA and EITI, along with
any other regime that seeks to bring governments together in a concerted
effort towards justice or fairness, is the recognition that law requires broad
cooperation in order to work, and that is no less true in the international
arena than in the domestic one. Thus, “[t]he effective authority of any legal
system depends in the long run upon the underlying common interests of the
participants in the system and their recognition of such common interests,
reflected in continuing predispositions to support the prescriptions and the
procedures that comprise the system.”130 FATCA and EITI face major
challenges in identifying such common interests and engendering
recognition of all stakeholders in carrying out the contemplated reforms.
These challenges are described in the next section.
IV. PUTTING THE REIGN BACK IN SOVEREIGN
FATCA and EITI are poised to reactivate the nation state in its quest to
protect the global fiscal order through comprehensive regulatory action.

127. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 4–5 (1959).
128. McDougall may be relatively unknown among the tax community, but his work on
international law and his contribution to the New Haven School of Jurisprudence earned him
worldwide recognition as an eminent expert on the rule and the role of law, and he had much to say
that would resonate especially among international tax scholars. See Michael Reisman, Myres S.
McDougal: Architect of a Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 66 MISS. L.J. 15 (1996).
129. While also likely unknown to tax scholars, Professor Lasswell was a professor of political
science and later law who studied the intersections of personality, economy, society, and politics and
has been referred to as “the most original and productive political scientist of his time.” See Gabriel
A. Almond, Harold Dwight Lasswell: 1902–1978, in BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIRS 249, 249 (Nat’l
Acad. of Scis. ed., 1987), available at http://www.nasonline.org/publications/biographicalmemoirs/memoir-pdfs/lasswell-harold.pdf.
130. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 127, at 4–5.
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This would be a positive development for international tax; it suggests that
the nation-state is not threatened, but rather is empowered by globalization
and technological advancement to reassert its right and its ability to rule.
This further indicates that the current unraveling of income taxation that
appears to be occurring all over the world could be reversed through
stronger, broader, and more effective regulation. In other words, the claim is
that political will alone stands in the way of a coherent and fair global tax
system. Unfortunately, both FATCA and EITI have fallen short of their
potential in ways that must be addressed if the ultimate goal is to be
achieved.
A. FATCA: Two Failures, Two Fixes
FATCA has fallen short of its potential in two ways. It has done so first
by violating strongly held perceptions about what a single state can and
should do as a member of international society, thereby exposing the U.S. to
global criticism and resistance, even from observers who agree with its
underlying goals. Much of the criticism is legitimate and could be resolved,
but resolution will not undo the reputational damage to the rule of law.
Second, and more damaging in the long run, FATCA has violated the
cooperative model and—even though its aspirations are global—the
legislation seems poised to create a world of cooperation among rich,
developed countries while excluding and isolating all others, particularly
those countries most fiscally vulnerable to tax evasion.131
The first failure is serious, but it is at least in part reversible. One
articulation of the problem in international law terms is that FATCA has
failed the jurisdictional reasonableness test by claiming that the U.S. a right
to regulate while failing to account adequately for the equal right of other
countries to set and enforce their own laws, including consumer banking and
privacy laws.132 This has created resistance in the international community,

131. See, e.g., Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2001–2010: Overview,
GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2013) (“The developing world lost US$859 billion in illicit outflows in 2010, an increase of 11%
over 2009. The capital outflows stem from crime, corruption, tax evasion, and other illicit
activity.”).
132. See Melissa A. Dizdarevic, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going Where No
Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2969 (2011) (describing how the IRS
has depended on voluntary information reporting and the use of withholding taxes to ensure that
income is collected); Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion, TAX NOTES, Apr. 20, 2009, at 264–
68 (explaining how the IRS uses a Qualified Intermediary program under which foreign banks that
receive payments certify the nationality of their depositors and reveal the identity of any American

1403

12 CHRISTIANS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/13 9:09 AM

especially in cases involving U.S. persons’ access to basic banking services
in jurisdictions in which they reside permanently and which are not “bank
secrecy jurisdictions” under any standard definition, and so cannot be easily
cast as perpetrators of violations against the U.S.133 The focus on this issue
is impeding the development of FATCA as a first step toward a multilateral
regime of automatic information sharing as its proponents envisioned
creating.134 The U.S. has responded to the problem of domestic law
interference by introducing intergovernmental agreements (IGAs). But
IGAs raise additional unanswered questions of legal procedure that are
significant rule of law questions in their own right.
For example, from the U.S. perspective, the intergovernmental
agreements that have been proposed and entered into are presumably created
under an existing tax treaty authorization which allows the competent
authorities “to clarify or interpret” existing treaty and tax information
exchange agreement provisions.135 In other words, the Treasury appears to
be presenting these instruments as diplomatic agreements to carry out
existing treaty policies. If this is the case, it represents a significant
expansion of the competent authority’s interpretive role, possibly beyond
anyone’s current conception and certainly beyond the intent of any of the
signatories to any U.S. treaties currently in force. Moreover, this
unprecedented expansion is occurring with no discussion of its legal
framework by the Treasury.
Yet we may speculate that these agreements are competent authority
agreements only as a matter of ruling out the alternatives, since the
agreements themselves carry no indicia of their legal pedigree and none has
been officially offered. Certainly, the agreements are not being undertaken
in a manner typical for competent authority agreements. The major
characteristic of a competent authority agreement is that it can be finalized

citizens using their banking services).
133. This is particularly troublesome for Americans who reside abroad, for whom FATCA
legislation may be obstructing their access to bank accounts, insurance coverage, and pension plans.
Brian Knowlton, More American Expatriates Give Up Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/26expat.html. For citizens in high-tax countries who will not
owe tax to the U.S. in most cases, compliance with the U.S. tax jurisdiction poses nothing more than
an expensive nuisance, so FATCA seems an additional unwarranted imposition. This may be why,
in Senator Levin’s Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, the focus of reform was placed on a list of targeted
jurisdictions, rather than all foreign countries. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. This
accords with the OECD approach, which, while deeply flawed, tried to cast its approach as a
defensive, rather than an aggressive, measure, aimed at nations in which taxpayers would be subject
to little or no taxation. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 8.
134. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 26 (Nov. 15, 2006),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf; ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, at M-62 to
M-65 (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxtreaties/47213736/pdf.
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by the competent authorities of treaty signatories without any ratification
procedures by either government, under the terms of the treaty.136 Hundreds,
perhaps even thousands, of competent agreements are entered into every
year on that basis.137 This clearly has not been the understanding of most of
the IGA signatories to date: with the exception of Mexico, each is pursuing
internal ratification procedures.138
Moreover, as a technical matter, it is difficult to see how these IGAs
could be competent authority agreements. First, none are formally described
as such by their terms, in contrast to other competent authority agreements,
which are consistently so described.139 Second, it appears that these
agreements are not being signed by competent authorities: in at least one
case, an agreement was signed by a U.S. embassy member rather than a
competent authority, while the identities of the signatories of other
agreements have not been made public.140 Both of these are technical

136. The product of competent authority resolution may take one of two forms: a taxpayerspecific competent authority agreement or a non-taxpayer-specific, generalized competent authority
agreement. See Competent Authority Agreements, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/InternationalTaxpayers/Competent-Authority-Agreements (last updated Mar. 19, 2013). The former is an agreedupon decision on an individual case; the latter is a generalized statement, typically characterized as
procedural, and is meant to “clarify or interpret treaty provisions.” Id. The former consists of
unpublished agreements that are applied only to the individual taxpayers in resolution of their cases,
while the latter results in public documents meant to be relied upon by other taxpayers. Most
competent authority agreements are specific rather than general; general agreements are published in
the U.S. in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and online. See Internal Revenue Bulletin, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/irb/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
137. See supra note 136.
138. See, e.g., Baker & MacKenzie, Client Alert: United States and Mexico FATCA
Intergovernmental Agreement: Effective January 1st, 2013, (Jan., 2013), in 2013 TAX ANALYSTS
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 12–20 (2013) (“Upon a number of consultations with the relevant tax
authorities, we have concluded that no need exists for the United States and Mexico FATCA
Intergovernmental Agreement to be published in the Mexican Federal Official Gazette in order for it
to be effective.”); Agreement Between the Department of Treasury of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to Improve International
Tax Compliance Including with Respect to FATCA, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 19, 2012, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-AgreementMexico-11-19-2012.pdf
139. See Competent Authority Agreements, supra note 136. All of the agreements posted on this
site are referred to as competent authority agreements by their terms, and all are signed by persons
who are named therein as the competent authorities of their respective states. The U.S.-Mexico
intergovernmental agreement is notably missing from this site even though it is currently in force.
Id.
140. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the United States of America to Improve International Tax
Compliance and to Implement FATCA, U.S.-U.K., Sept. 12, 2012, available at http://www.hm
treasury.gov.uk/d/facta_agreement_tax_compliance_140912.pdf (signed by David Gauke on behalf
of “The Government of the United States” and by Barbara Stephenson “For the Government of the
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matters that may seem trivial on the surface, but they open up IGAs to
scrutiny because they do not accord with the usual practice for international
tax agreements, a practice from which the U.S. has not deviated for almost a
century.
This brings the IGAs into murky status under U.S. law, as it seems that
no internal legislative procedure will be undertaken to enact these
international agreements in the U.S.—they appear to await only internal
ratification by FATCA partners. If so, the agreements represent another
unprecedented first in the history of U.S. tax law and tax treaty making: they
appear to introduce a new category of sole executive agreements on taxation,
not pre-authorized by congress, not expressly authorized by any existing
treaty, and serving to override existing statutory tax law without any
congressional oversight at all.141 The rule of law implications of this kind of
muddled approach to what appears to be an ambitious assertion of the U.S.
tax jurisdiction is highly problematic.
A second articulation of the rule of law problem is that FATCA unearths
and harshly highlights an existing but perhaps little-noticed jurisdictional
reasonability failure by the U.S., namely its practice of citizenship-based
taxation. Since the violation of the residence principle by status-based
jurisdictional assertions has long been clear, FATCA emerges as an
economic sanction to enforce an order that, now under a spotlight, many
view as indefensible in principle.142 Statutorily, this sanction is imposed on
foreign institutions, but the impact is that U.S. persons living in other

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”). Barbara Stephenson is a U.S. Minister at
the United States Embassy in London. See Barbara J. Stephenson, EMBASSY OF UNITED STATES
LONDON U.K., http://london.usembassy.gov/ukdcm.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). It may be
possible for the U.S. competent authority, currently Michael Danilack, to deputize the Minister to
act, but there is no record of such deputization and there appear to be no other competent authority
agreements signed by her on behalf of the U.S. competent authority. The most recent competent
authority agreements have been signed by Michael Danilack. See, e.g., Competent Authority
Agreement, U.S.-Nor., Nov., 2012, available at http://www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/international/
USNorwaySourceofremunerationforgovernmentservicesandsocialsecuritypaymentsDecember2012.p
df; Competent Authority Agreement, U.S.-Neth, May 21, 2012, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/dutch_lfma_map.pdf; Competent Authority Agreement, U.S.-Ger.,
Mar. 19, 2012, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/german_pension_fund_map_2012.pdf..
141. None of this necessarily impacts the legal force of the IGAs from an international
perspective. In the eyes of the world, these may be viewed as equivalent to any other international
agreement.
142. See, e.g., Bishnodat Persaud, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Policy: A Major Issue
for Small States, in INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: GLOBALISATION AND FISCAL
SOVEREIGNTY 17, 19 (Rajiv Biswas ed., 2002) (“Defensive measures . . . are a polite usage for
sanctions . . . .”). The imposition of a sanction is a serious matter in international law and generally
requires clear justification. Scholars debate, for example, what level of violation of human life or
dignity should be tolerated before one state should intervene militarily to restore order or save lives.
For a discussion of views see NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 256–57 (noting that even in cases of
human rights violation, some of which have been extreme, forcible intervention and economic
sanction have been used “in a very small number of cases”).
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countries may now be viewed as a burden for foreign institutions who find it
more expedient to deny them basic account services—even when there is no
evidence of tax fraud or criminal activity—than to face the high cost of
compliance with U.S. law.143
Predictably, this has given rise to vociferous objection from parties who
may not themselves even be subject to FATCA or its related reporting
requirements, but who see the interaction of FATCA and citizenship-based
taxation as an unnecessary affront to human mobility as well as a violation
of important international norms.144 In international law terms, FATCA’s
enforcement of citizenship-based taxation appears to violate the duty of the
U.S. to “take into account the sovereign interests of other states, yet at the
same time ensure that the interests of the forum State and of the international
community are sufficiently heeded.”145 The violation arises because it
involves pursuing people who live, work, and pay taxes in other countries
based on their ongoing status as citizens or green card holders in the U.S.,
even if they also hold citizenship in the country of their residence.146 Many
such dual or multiple citizens may have lived for years, decades, and even
lifetimes without understanding their ongoing obligations to the U.S.; some
may not even have realized they had such status, because they may have
mistakenly believed that citizenship required their affirmative consent or
pursuit.147
There are some fairly straightforward solutions to the citizenship-based
jurisdictional reasonability problem, but they would require a political
appetite for tax reform that may be lacking in the U.S. One solution is to

143. Under the statute, foreign financial institutions have three choices with respect to accounts
held by persons with U.S. status: pay the increased cost of compliance with U.S. law, pay the cost of
withholding on U.S. investments, or divest from the U.S. market. See FATCA Deadline Looms for
International Banks, EUROMONEY (Aug. 2012), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3067431/
Fatca-deadline-looms-for-international-banks.html. Media reports suggest that financial institutions
appear to view ridding themselves of U.S. customers as a fourth option, even though simply having
no U.S. customers does not exempt them from demonstrating their compliance. See Robert W.
Wood, Americans Become Undesirable as FATCA Closes More Doors, FORBES, Oct. 25, 2012,
available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/10/25/americans-are-undesirable-asfatca-closes-more-doors/ (“[T]hese days, anyone but Americans seems likely to be welcomed into
foreign banks. Welcome to FATCA, the global U.S. law that applies in earnest in 2013. Americans
everywhere are facing ostracism and some are voting with their feet.”).
144. See, e.g., RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 3.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See U.S. Dep’t of State, US State Services Dual Nationality, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (“Persons may
have dual nationality by automatic operation of different laws rather than by choice.”).
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reverse course incrementally by either exempting any assets or accounts held
in the same country as the owner’s residence, defined for these purposes
under the international standard (such as that encompassed in the OECD
Model tax convention).148 That does not relieve the compliance burden of
foreign institutions, but it does remove some of the stigma created by
highlighting citizenship taxation via an already controversial expansion of
the U.S. tax jurisdiction.149 A related incremental step would be to move in
the direction of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act by creating a “high tax
country” kickout of sorts, which would exempt listed jurisdictions from
FATCA. The U.S. Treasury has already stated that it will not consider such
a move, so there are high political barriers to this solution even though it
would accord with past international practice (not to mention the plain
language of the statute).150 Both of these incremental steps would move the
U.S. closer to the residence standards embraced by other countries, including
all of its developed country peers, and relieve some of the opposition to
FATCA.
The rule of law questions raised by FATCA are thus solvable in theory,
but perhaps even more problematic to FATCA’s development is that this
reform has fallen far short of its potential by failing to enact the legislation
to ensure reciprocity in information gathering and exchange by the U.S.
itself.151 This has the potential to be a much more serious problem in the
long run, because it proposes a turn away from multilateralism and toward a
world in which developed countries can and will take what they want from
poor countries under the guise of leveling a playing field which is already
heavily skewed toward the global north. In this case, information and
capital will flow from poor countries to the U.S. without any information
flowing in the opposite direction. Unlike the other issues raised by FATCA,
the path to multilateralism and the commodification of information cannot
be reversed by unilateral action on the part of the U.S.
This violation occurs because the statutory FATCA regime is a one-way
information street, the currently proposed solution to that one-way street is
an only partially two-way street, and even that partial solution will be denied
to most poor countries. FATCA is a one-way street because it only extracts
information from foreign financial institutions: though the IRS will enter

148. See Allison Christians, Could a Same-Country Exception Help Focus FATCA and FBAR?,
66 TAX NOTES INT’L 157 (2012).
149. Id. at 159.
150. See John McCrank, Update 1—Canada Hopes for Exemption on US FATCA Rules: Treasury
Says Not Considering Exemption for Canada, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2011, 5:13 PM), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/canada-usa-taxes-idUSN1E7941R120111005.
151. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act §§ 501–531, Pub..L. No. 111–147, 124
Stat. 71 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
PLAW-111publ147/pdf/PLAW-111publ147.pdf.
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into “agreements” with these institutions, there is clearly no quid pro quo
from the U.S. to the foreign financial institutions or their home countries.152
FATCA’s partial two-way street emerges in the IGAs, but these are not
genuinely two-way since the information they extract from other
governments is far more expansive than the information the U.S. is willing
to require its own institutions to disclose for the benefit of foreign
governments.153 The IGAs contain aspirational language suggesting that the
U.S. is committed to seeking reciprocity at some future point.154 But at
present, the best a foreign country can hope for in terms of additional
information from the U.S. is its addition to a list of countries with which the
U.S. will exchange portfolio interest-related information on an automatic
basis.155 There is only one country currently on that list—Canada—and that
country was already in a reciprocal information sharing relationship with the
U.S.156
But even these aspirational utterances toward a multilateral automatic
information exchange network will be denied to most developing countries.
This is because of the manner in which the U.S. is casting the IGAs as
treaty-based agreements rather than treaties.157 The reason for doing so may
be to bypass onerous treaty-making requirements—including achieving the
advice and consent of the Senate—by couching the IGAs with an existing
authority. But the unintended consequence is that reciprocal IGAs can only
be entered into with the U.S. on the strength of an existing tax agreement.158
Accordingly, only those countries that have existing double tax
conventions or tax information sharing agreements, or that have signed the
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (Mutual
Assistance Convention), can hope to achieve even the nominally reciprocal
relationship offered by an IGA.159 Without one of these agreements in place,
a state would not be able to extract even that unequal bargain:160 there is

152. Id.
153. See, e.g., MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 6, at 6–9.
154. See id.
155. 26 C.F.R. 1.6049-8 (2010).
156. Id. This observation explains why Canada, even more than other countries, stands to gain
little or nothing in terms of base protection from an IGA with the U.S.
157. See, e.g., MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 6, at 6–9.
158. See id. at 1; Laila Arstall, Jersey: FATCA—Intergovernmental Agreements for Crown
Dependencies,
MONDAQ
(Dec.
17,
2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/207552/tax+authorities/FATCA+InterGovernmental+Agreements+For+
Crown+Dependencies (noting the dependence of IGAs on existing tax treaties).
159. See MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 6, at 1
160. Robert W. Wood, Expats Call for FATCA Repeal, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2011, 8:22 AM),
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apparently no current government-to-government FATCA alternative for
countries that lack tax agreements with the U.S. As the U.S. history of tax
agreements historically excludes the global south, the IGA regime
necessarily excludes most of it as well.161
The result is that poor countries, for which illicit flows of capital
heading for sanctuary in U.S. accounts represents a major and even
catastrophic loss of revenue, will not gain much opportunity to protect their
own tax bases under the FATCA/IGA regime. What is perhaps even more
serious for the international tax regime is that the U.S., having achieved its
own objectives with respect to information flow on a unilateral basis, will
have no reason to bargain multilaterally with these countries in any other
forum. Far from creating a step toward global automatic information
sharing, FATCA appears poised to separate the globe into information haves
and information have-nots, with rich countries as the major beneficiaries.
These are grave policy failures for the U.S. that should cause great
concern for those who think information flows are just as critical to
development in poor countries as they are to the preservation of the welfare
state in rich ones. Because FATCA is framed in defensive terms as a
protection of the U.S. tax base, and a preservation of fairness for U.S.
taxpayers as against each other,162 the concerns of the global poor are
overlooked and ignored in the conversation. Unless these violations are
addressed, FATCA threatens to turn information into a commodity that can
only be extracted by rich countries and will be used by those countries for
their own advantage, even as they perversely maintain institutional and
regulatory support for tax evasion by persons from other jurisdictions. That
is a serious issue for anyone who is concerned with defining a reasonable
jurisdiction for the state as a member responsible to others in an
international society of states.
B. EITI: First Implement It, Then Expand It
EITI, like FATCA, has great potential for reasserting the state’s role in
regulating taxation on a global basis.163 EITI’s potential lies in the assertion

http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/09/06/expats-call-for-fatca-repeal.
161. The U.S. Treasury could intend to extend IGA eligibility to members of the OECD Mutual
Assistance Convention, thus potentially increasing the scope for reciprocity, but it is not clear that
this could be done on a bilateral, case-by-case basis. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
STATUS OF THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS AND
AMENDING PROTOCOL (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-taxinformation/Status_of_convention.pdf.
162. See Dana Ward & Anne Stopford, FATCA—Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, WORLD
FIN. REV., http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=616 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
163. See Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The Implications of the
Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 37, 51 (2008).
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that all stakeholders—including shareholders, governments, and civil society
at large—have an interest in knowing how public companies and
governments behave and interact internationally. This observation leads
logically to an inquiry into the limited scope of EITI. But if disclosure
would solve information asymmetries in the market to the benefit of
stakeholders in the U.S. and around the world, one may well wonder why it
is limited to the extractive industries. Answering this question reveals some
obstacles that still need to be overcome for EITI to fulfill its potential.
The first obstacle to overcome is resistance to public disclosure. As in
the case of FATCA, vociferous opposition has significantly delayed the
implementation of the enacting legislation.164 Industry resistance delayed the
promulgation of interpretive regulations—just as it did in FATCA—and it is
delaying the actual disclosure required by the legislation—again, in a
parallel to FATCA. But in this case, the resistance does not derive primarily
from what may have been unintended effects of the legislation based on its
interaction with other laws, as is arguably the case with FATCA. Instead,
the resistance is from the direct target of the regulation, namely, the
extractive industries themselves.165 One surprising aspect of this resistance
is that it is emanating from some who continue to voice strong support for
EITI principles internationally.166
In a sign of the global nature of tax policymaking, the E.U.’s imminent
adoption of a more lax standard than that enumerated in the EITI rules has

164. See Alex Barker & Guy Chazen, Lobbyists Fight to Weaken Graft Rules, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
11, 2012, 8:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8a59acc-83d4-11e1-84ca-00144feab49a.html
(discussing how industry lobbyists are working to “dilute ‘project-by-project’ disclosure rules being
developed in the U.S. and the E.U.); Edward Wyatt, Use of ‘Conflict Minerals’ Gets More Scrutiny
from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/business/use-ofconflict-minerals-gets-more-scrutiny.html (discussing how industry pressure has undermined and
consistently sidelined EITI implementation)..
165. See Ken Silverstein, As Oil Pours into Gulf, Oil Industry Fights Anti-Corruption Measure,
HARPERS (May 11, 2010), http://harpers.org/archive/2010/05/hbc-90007021 (explaining the
opposition of the American Petroleum Institute, a trade association that represents the U.S. oil and
gas industry); Publish What You Pay USA, Oil Company Lawsuit Against US SEC Threatens EITI,
GLOBAL WITNESS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/oil-company-lawsuitagainst-us-sec-threatens-eiti (describing American Petroleum Institute lawsuit to repeal EITI
disclosure). For an overview of similar resistance by the Canadian mining industry in response to
parallel legislation proposed there see Sharp Criticism for Bill C-300: Lawyers Tell Parliamentary
Committee Private Member’s Bill Threatens Canada’s Minerals Industry, FASKEN MARTINEAU
(Nov. 26, 2009), www.fasken.com/firm-opposes-bill-c-300-in-ottawa/; Corporate Social
Responsibility: Bill C-300, PROSPECTORS & DEVS. ASS’N OF CAN., http://www.pdac.ca/publicaffairs/corporate-social-responsibility/public-affairs/2012/01/03/bill-c-300 (explaining the role
PDAC played in opposing the passage of Act 300).
166. See, e.g., supra note 51.
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served to invigorate industry resistance to EITI in the U.S. This
demonstrates that, like FATCA, EITI is a means of halting a regulatory race
to the bottom.167 In the case of information, the race is in the direction of
minimal disclosure standards. As one report observed, “[i]f the compromise
passes in Brussels, it will bolster industry arguments that the U.S. rules
implementing Dodd-Frank should be watered down to match the E.U.
approach and ensure a level playing field.”168 But a level playing field
would quite obviously exist if the global market has full information; that is,
if all multinational companies engaged in full disclosure of their tax
payments in all countries and if all stakeholders—shareholders,
taxpayers, governments, and watchdog groups—had the same information
about how multinationals engage in pitting countries against each other in
the global tax competition game.169
Accordingly, the best possible path forward for EITI is to overcome
industry opposition and enforce the law that is already on the books, but also
to expand disclosure beyond the extractive industries to all public
companies. This will engender (and in concept has already engendered)
additional resistance, but it is the only legitimate solution to the level playing
field problem.170 At a meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Transparency
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes held in 2010, U.K. Tax
Minister Stephen Timms stated that the OECD ought to lead a global
discussion on broad-based EITI-style disclosure by multinationals, on the
grounds that “there should be transparency about where companies earn
their profits and where they pay their tax.”171 Timms stated that the OECD
ought to issue multinational guidelines through a process of discussion
among governments, multinationals, and civil society, in order to define a
standard that would then become globalized through the OECD’s soft law
channels.172
Both EITI and FATCA emerge in the context of a waning of public trust
of the state amidst stories of rampant and too-often unpunished fraud and
abuse of the tax system by individuals and multinationals.173 These failures

167. See Christians, supra note 112, at 844.
168. Barker & Chazen, supra note 164.
169. See Genasci & Pray, supra note 163, at 51–54; EITI’s Evolution from CSR to Governance
Standard Is Key to Emerging Economies, EITI NEWS (EITI INT’L SECRETARIAT, Oslo, Nor.), July
2010, at 5, available at http://eiti.org/files/EITI-Newsletter-2010-July.pdf.
170. See Morris, supra note 123.
171. Stephen Timms, U.K. Fin. Sec’y to the Treasury, Remarks at OECD Tax and Development
Conference
in
Paris,
(Jan.
27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/speech_fst_270110.htm.
172. See id.
173. See Rick Cohen, Bono, the Edge, Charges of Tax Evasion, and More, NONPROFIT Q. (July
14, 2011, 4:39 PM), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/updates/14041-bono-the-edge-charges-oftax-evasion-and-more.html; Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax
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of the state are juxtaposed against the equal failure of large revenue
shortfalls and cuts to public sector programs through austerity-based
reforms.174 The search for greater accountability with respect to the taxes
ostensibly sought by governments, but avoided by individuals and
multinationals, is an appropriate response in principle, but much remains to
be worked out in the implementation.
V. CONCLUSION
The first Obama administration undertook some important steps forward
in protecting the income tax against its ongoing erosion under the pressures
of globalization.175 The second (and future U.S. administrations) could do
more, and better. The first step forward must include addressing some of the
unresolved and important oversights created by its initial legislation; in
particular, those provisions that pertain to working out a reasonable
jurisdictional reach for the tax state. This will require addressing the
problems presented by FATCA without going too far in the direction of
aiding and abetting criminal activity including tax evasion. In turn, this will
require the United States to reconsider the appropriateness of citizenshipbased taxation with respect to individuals who live abroad and hold dual or
multiple citizenship or permanent residence status, perhaps especially when
such persons reside in countries that impose high taxes on their residents.
By resolving these issues, the United States should be able to relieve some
of the international resistance to FATCA on the grounds that it unduly
interferes with the exercise of jurisdiction by an equally positioned
Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html; Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html;
Glenn Greenwald, HSBC, Too Big to Jail, Is the New Poster Child for US Two-Tiered Justice
System, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/12/hsbcprosecution-fine-money-laundering; James S Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited, TAX JUST.
NETWORK (July 2012), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_
120722.pdf (noting that $21 to $31 trillion is invested tax free via offshore holdings).
174. See France Needs More Reform not Austerity: EU’s Rehn, EUBUSINESS (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/finance-public-debt.ljn; Paul Krugman, The Austerity Bomb,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012, 9:22 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/the-austeritybomb/; Paul Krugman, Hasty Fiscal Fix to Deficit Would Cause ‘Austerity Bomb’, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec12/krugman_12-04.html; Costas
Meghir, et al., Greece Needs Growth, Not Austerity, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-20/greece-needs-growth-not-austerity.html; .
175. See Jeanne Sahadi, Obama: Slash Corporate Tax Breaks and Rates, CNN MONEY (Feb. 22,
2012, 2:51 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/22/news/economy/obama_corporate_taxes/index.
htm.
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sovereign, paving the way for renewed cooperation on a multilateral basis
with the intended target of FATCA—namely, international tax evasion
perpetrated by wealthy Americans who live in the United States.
The second step forward is to expand the accountability of financial and
nonfinancial institutions to stakeholders, which includes civil society as a
whole. This can and should be accomplished by making FATCA fully
reciprocal by expanding the reporting requirements applicable to U.S.
financial institutions and by adopting more, and more inclusive, automatic
information sharing mechanisms, especially for the benefit of poor countries.
It should also be advanced by expanding EITI beyond the extractive
industries sector, so that stakeholders can assess the fruits of the
international tax rules that have encouraged the erosion of the income tax
base.
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